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Many  economists  tend  to  be  skeptical  of  the  merits  of  Free-Trade Areas  (FTAs)  due  to  their  second-best 
nature, while others support them under certain conditions, particularly as they allow for a more comprehensive 
treatment of trade- and investment-related issues than is currently possible under the 149-member WTO. This 
paper endeavors to bridge this analytical chasm by developing a blueprint for “first-best“ regionalism based on 
“best practices.“ It then applies the associated set of rules to existing FTAs in Asia (both intra- and extra-regional) 
to guage the degree to which they approach best practices. In summary, we find that most accords receive high 
marks in most areas, with the exception of “rules of origin“ and certain service sectors.2
Toward Win-Win Regionalism in Asia:
Issues and Challenges in Forming Efficient Trade Agreements
I. Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO) projected that at the end of 2005, regional trade agreements 
between WTO members would approach 300, up from 130 as of 1 January 1995. Regionalism 
came late to Asia; apart from the ASEAN Free-Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, no Asian country had 
a significant bilateral or plurilateral2 accord in place prior to 2000, whereas today there exist at 
least a dozen major free-trade areas (FTAs) and many more in the works. Given the uncertain 
outcome of negotiations at the multilateral negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda, the 
regionalism movement currently constitutes the most significant trend in international commercial 
policy. Unlike multilateral liberalization, regionalism tends to be controversial in economic and 
policy circles for a variety of reasons, most of which are linked to the fact that preferential trading 
arrangements, such as FTAs and customs unions, are by their very nature, discriminatory. Why 
adopt “second-best” policies such as free-trade areas when the first-best policy can be obtained 
through multilateral negotiations? Others would argue that regionalism and multilateralism are 
consistent, even perhaps reinforcing. They cite the fact that the vast majority of regional trading 
arrangements have been negotiated over the past decade, when international trade and investment 
have boomed and globalization has intensified. This is not to say necessarily that regionalism 
caused this expansion in trade, but it does give prima facie evidence that they are compatible. 
The disagreement among mainstream economists over this issue pertains to means rather than 
ends. Each school advocates global free trade (and investment) as an ultimate goal, but they 
differ in opinion as to whether or not regionalism is a stepping-stone or a bottleneck,. This split is 
arguably the first major policy difference that has emerged among international trade economists 
since the “new international economic order” debate of the 1960s. 
Could there be a synthesis? Yes. In fact, the basic idea of “open regionalism,” which emerged in the 
context of the  Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, is explicitly to unite the region through 
nondiscriminatory means. The idea found its theoretical origin in the Kemp-Wan Existence Theorem 
(Kemp and Wan 1976), which stipulated the conditions of a Pareto-optimal customs union,—one in 
which all countries would be better off.3 By liberalizing unilaterally—but in a concerted fashion among 
countries producing the majority of world output—“open regionalism” under APEC was advocated 
as a first-best approach to regionalism and became enshrined in APEC’s “Bogor Vision” of open 
trade and investment in the region by 2010 (2020 for developing countries). However, while the 
economics of such an approach would be generally applauded by both the pro- and anti-regionalism 
camps, the politics were clearly second-best (at most): “value-added” in trade liberalization toward 
the Bogor goals has been marginal, and the first deadline is only 4 years away. The vagueness of the
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 WTO website, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm, accessed 6 October 2006. 
2 Defined here as between one or more countries and one regional group, or between two regional groups. 
3 In short, this would be possible if the customs union were to (i) set the common external tariff such that trade with the 
outside world is not affected (thereby setting trade diversion to zero); (ii) impose free trade within the customs union, such 
that efficiency gains would be generated; and (iii) provide a compensation mechanism for any country that would be a net 
loser.3
commitment (for example, what “open trade and investment” means, the question of whether or not 
“open regionalism” should be nonreciprocal for non-partners in order to reap the benefits), and its 
“voluntary” nature have taken away any political urgency. While the countdown to 2010 may create 
some momentum, the political obstacles will be daunting. Evidence of private sector disappointment 
with the lack of progress in meeting the Bogor goals is perhaps evidenced by the recent (January 2006) 
decision by the APEC Business Advisory Committee (ABAC) and the Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Council (PECC) to launch a study on the political economy of a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific 
(FTAAP), which would ostensibly be an extension of the “reciprocal open regionalism” option. Also, 
even in applying the APEC agenda, it has been difficult to avoid discriminatory components however 
unintended, for example, in terms of sector selection,4 sequencing, and even institution building. 
Instead bilateral and plurilateral accords ostensibly have emerged to fill the gap left by APEC in “uniting” 
the region. Practically all countries in Asia have at least one bilateral agreement in place—with more 
on the way—when very few had any before 2002, the exception being AFTA.5 As will be noted below, 
Asia has been extremely active in cementing regional accords over the past 3 years, both with partner 
and non-partner countries.
In this paper we attempt to take stock of these new initiatives in the context of the “building blocs 
versus stumbling blocs” debate, evaluate them in terms of their meeting various efficiency-related 
and “openness” criteria (which we will argue is necessary for the accords to be consistent with WTO 
goals and economic efficiency), and suggest how the negative ramifications of these many accords—
the “spaghetti bowl” effect—can be minimized. Given that regionalism will inevitably have “second 
best” aspects, our goal is to develop a concrete approach to “open regionalism” that can be used 
as a general best-practices guide to FTAs in Asia—one that approximates a first-best solution to the 
greatest extent possible in practical terms. It is hoped that such a guide will also be applicable to FTAs 
in other regions as well.
We approach this topic first by surveying the various bilateral and regional accords in Asia and their 
constituent parts (Section II). Section III develops a taxonomy of the problems that are associated with 
having such a wide variety of agreements, and what can be done to minimize them. This is followed 
in Section IV by an evaluation of existing accords in Asia with respect to how well they meet criteria 
associated with efficiency and “open regionalism,” as well as their consistency with structural policy 
reform at the national level. Section V gives some concluding remarks and recommendations for future 
work. The rest of this Section I is devoted to setting the stage for the analysis of Asian regionalism in a 
global context. We begin with a brief review of the contemporary global trade framework in which the 
regionalism trend has developed, followed by an analysis of the difficulties involved in estimating the 
economic implications of global and regional integration in the context of developing countries.
a. The WTO, Doha, and the Regionalism Zeitgeist
Relative to previous negotiating rounds, Doha has been characterized by far greater participation of 
developing countries, raising expectations as to what they hope to receive from developed countries 
 
4 For instance, the APEC Ministerial meeting in 1996 suggested the identification of sectors that might be slated for early 
liberalization in APEC, which was eventually to be known as “Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization” (EVSL). In 1997, they 
delineated 15 sectors for priority liberalization. However, in 1998 these negotiations broke down and the idea was shelved. 
In fact, economists tended to be skeptical of this approach, as the limited number of sectors and sequencing issues could 
have led to important negative effects on effective rates of protection and other potential (indirect) efficiency problems. 
5 Moreover, AFTA is far from complete: some exclusion lists are still in the process of being phased out, and the ASEAN 
Member Countries that acceded in the 1990s—Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam (or CLMV)—will be fully 
integrated only in 2008 at the earliest.4
in  terms  of  liberalization  of  hitherto  sacrosanct  sectors—particularly  labor-intensive  products  and 
agriculture, including market access but especially export subsidies—if the ambitious Doha agenda is 
to move forward. This has given the impression of “North-South” tension at this round of negotiations, 
something in evidence since the Seattle WTO Ministerial meeting in 1999. In reality the situation is far 
more complex. Developing countries have become more active at Doha because the vast majority of 
countries now embrace outward-oriented policies and they now count on the international marketplace 
for continued and enhanced growth and development. In the past, these countries were not active at 
GATT rounds, as they generally “free-rided” on commitments between developed countries from which 
they also received most-favored nation (MFN) benefits. The cost of this approach became evident 
in time; the sectors that were being liberalized were of principal interest to developed, rather than 
developing, countries. In order to include comparative-advantage sectors of the developing countries, 
a proactive stance at WTO was, of course, necessary. The G-20 group of developing countries6 is one 
expression of this new approach. However, much of its agenda can be considered “global” rather than 
merely “North-South,” as various developed countries can be listed among the supporters of many of 
their causes, and v��e ver��.
Disillusionment with progress at Doha may be one reason for the proliferation of regional agreements 
in Asia and the rest of the world, particularly accords between developed and developing countries.   
The ambitious agenda of Doha, from both developed- and developing-country viewpoints, could be 
more easily managed bilaterally or between a small group of countries than in an organization of 149 
highly-divergent economies. Hence, it is no mystery as to why many of the new bilateral/plurilateral 
agreements are between developed and developing countries: what is needed to integrate global 
markets further, from nontariff barriers to non-border issues, may be too much to handle at the WTO. 
In some ways, the supposed “North-South” conflict at the WTO is really a sign of maturity. During 
1950s–1970s,  most  trading  arrangements  were  between  countries  at  similar  levels  of  economic 
development. North-South accords were mainly in the form of nonreciprocal preferences extended 
by developed countries to developing countries (through the Generalized System of Preferences, or 
GSP), association agreements, and/or extension of colonial preferences.7 The North American Free 
Trade Area (NAFTA), which began implementation in 1994, was the first significant preferential trading 
arrangement between developed countries and a major developing economy. Since then, many such 
agreements have been negotiated and implemented. Indeed, most new agreements are between 
developed and developing countries or developing countries themselves.8
The WTO is cognizant of the regionalism trend and understands the problems that it could potentially 
entail for the global trading system. It is not in an easy situation; fundamentally it must see regionalism 
as a threat, but as almost all of its member-states are now part of the trend, it cannot seriously advocate 
setting back the clock. Thus, it has vowed to adopt policies that ensure that these agreements do 
not contradict its goal of open global trade and investment and keep regionalism as consistent with 
multilateralism as possible. Indeed, while Article XXIV of the GATT/WTO does put some restrictions on 
what can be done  in regional trading agreements involving developed countries, these rules are broad, 
relatively vague, and loose, such that no major agreement has ever been vetoed by the GATT or WTO, 
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6 The G-20 actually has 21 members: five from Africa (Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe), six from Asia 
(PRC, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand), and 10 from Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela). 
7 The EU generally grew out of the donor-recipient approach in its relationship with developing Asian countries, at least 
officially, with its 1994 paper on the “Partnership of Equals with Asia.” 
8 This will also be true in the future, for the simple reason that developed (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development—OECD) countries are either already integrated through preferential trading arrangements (for example, the 
EU  and the European Economic Area, the United States [US] and Canada) or are unlikely to reach any accords in the near 
future due to political and political-economy reasons (for example, a “Transatlantic Free Trade Area” and US-Japan free-
trade area have been proposed at various times but have never been seriously negotiated due to various political-economy 
problems).5
regardless of any infringements of limits spelled out in Article XXIV.9 Besides, developing countries, by 
virtue of the “Enabling Clause,” are not even bound by the mild exigencies of Article XXIV. 0
The challenges of regionalism to the WTO are many, but two in particular stand out. First, the GATT/WTO 
was created with MFN treatment as its overriding principle, and Article XXIV was to be a conditional 
exception to this rule. With nearly 300 accords in place and every major economy participating in at 
least one FTA (and most in many), what happens when the exception becomes the rule? How valid 
is the coveted MFN, a birthright of WTO membership, when regional trading arrangements erode it 
and, in essence, force countries into regional trading arrangements to ge� b��k MFN status? Second, 
as we will argue below, regionalism is not necessarily in conflict with multilateralism, subject to the 
principle of openness and minimization of the inefficiencies and potential discrimination inherent in 
regional agreements. But if regionalism is taking the lead, the fundamental role of the WTO in the 
global economy would have to change, if it is not to be become redundant. 
Recognizing these challenges, members of the WTO have been discussing the need to revamp the 
organization’s policies toward regionalism. The 1994 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article  XXIV 
of GATT was an attempt to enhance the compatibility of regionalism with multilateralism at a time when 
the regionalism trend was beginning to grow. It had several functions, including agreement to (i) reaffirm 
the requirement that regional groupings should not raise barriers to trade on nonmembers; (ii) define 
a “reasonable length of time” within which a regional agreement should be completed to be greater 
than 10 years “only in exceptional cases;” (iii) note that especially in the cases of difficult-to-quantify 
measures the GATT may find it necessary to consider “individual measures, regulations, products 
covered, and trade flows affected;” and (iv) underscore that the WTO dispute settlement provisions 
are relevant to any matters related to regionalism under Article XXIV ((Herzstein and Whitlock 2005, 
pp. 225–226). 
Under the Doha Development Agenda, further revisions of interpretations of Article XXIV are slated to 
be an important area of focus. Recommendations as to how to improve Article XXIV are to be part of 
its “single undertaking,” which was due to be completed by 1 January 2005 (but has obviously been 
delayed). Stock-taking of progress in this regard was to be made at the WTO Ministerial in Cancun, 
Mexico in 2003, but Cancun ended without any agreement. In fact, it is not at all clear how the WTO 
should approach this issue, as the dimensions are many. As the WTO notes:
WTO  rules  say  regional  trade  agreements  have  to  meet  certain  conditions.  But 
interpreting the wording of these rules has proved controversial, and has been a 
central element in the work of the Regional Trade Agreements Committee. As a 
result, since 995 the committee has failed to complete its assessments of whether 
individual trade agreements conform with WTO provisions.
This is now an important challenge, particularly when nearly all member governments 
are parties to regional agreements, are negotiating them, or are considering negotiating 
them. In the Doha Declaration, members agreed to negotiate a solution, giving due 
regard to the role that these agreements can play in fostering development.
 
9 For example, the EEC-EFTA Free Trade Area, created in the 1960s, included only manufactured goods, in clear violation of 
the “substantially all goods” principle in Article XXIV. The US-Canada Auto Pact of 1965 was restricted to one (albeit major) 
industrial sector. 
0 It will be argued that the flexibility allowed by the Enabling Clause has been detrimental to developing countries over the 
years, as it prompted a “piecemeal,” positive-list approach that had little effect on trade and yet created distortions. 
 As of June 2006, no formal Doha package had been forthcoming, despite the earlier self-imposed deadline of April 2006. 
At the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, the WTO member-states committed themselves to an agreement with 
respect to regional trade agreements under the “rules” negotiations, but the goals were quite modest. In particular, the 
main objective was to inject greater “transparency” in bilateral and regional trading agreements. According to the WTO 
webpage as of May 2006 (www.wto.org), an agreement in this area was highly probable, but again, the focus would 
merely be on “transparency.”6
The declaration mandates negotiations aimed at “���r�fy��g ��d �mpr�v��g d����p���e� 
��d  pr��edure�  u�der  �he  ex�����g  WTO  pr�v������  applying  to  regional  trade 
agreements. The negotiations shall take into account the deve��pme���� ��pe��� �f 
reg����� �r�de �greeme���.” (par 29, emphasis added).2 
Two important issues are especially worthy of note here. First is the recognition that the current state 
of WTO provisions relative to regionalism are inadequate. Further, the Regional Trade Agreements 
Committee has not been able to accept (or reject) the proposition that current trade agreements conform 
with WTO provisions, no doubt due to the subjective nature of any such assessment (and political 
resistence against criticism by some of the contracting parties). Second, there is a clear emphasis on 
assessing the implications of these regional trade agreements for developing countries, which would 
only seem natural under the Doha Deve��pme�� Agenda. 
Below, we give a critique of the existing ���dem�� literature focused on regional trading agreements, 
and consider what special significance they may have for developing countries. 
b. Problems with Economic Models of Contemporary Trade Agreements
Most  of  the  policy-related  literature  dealing  with  various  aspects  of  global  economic  integration 
developed over the past half-century has focused on the tariff-liberalization aspects of commercial 
policy reform, rather than nontariff, non-border, and dynamic effects. This is true of both theoretical and 
empirical models, with the possible exception of certain ex-p��� empirical approaches.3 Such a bias 
was arguably more relevant at a time when tariffs constituted the main weapons of commercial policy. 
However, this is no longer the case; contemporary trade negotiations at all levels are often dominated by 
nontariff and behind-the-border issues. Given the complicated nature of modern trade and the activities 
of multinational corporations, this is an important shortcoming, especially since economists agree that 
these latter effects are far more influential on future growth than mere tariff liberalization could possibly 
be. Today, average tariff levels in the largest economies have fallen considerably. Average tariffs in EU, 
Japan, and US are currently below 5%. True, there are tariff peaks, and liberalization within the context 
of a formal regional accord could have important sector effects. Still, when policymakers look to models 
for guidance as to what effects a trade pact will have, they usually focus on aggregate effects. And 
these are inevitably going to be small. Therefore, empirical models of modern trade liberalization could 
seriously underestimate the benefits of economic integration if they exclude these areas.  
Of course, it is extremely difficult to model and measure accurately nontariff, non-border/policy-related, 
and dynamic effects of economic integration, which is obviously why so few empirical models include 
them (we review certain exceptions later). But their exclusion may in fact be misleading in ways that 
could be detrimental to policymaking, including during negotiations for regional and bilateral FTAs. 
An example might illustrate the point. In one fairly-frequently cited study using a standard applied 
Computation General Equilibrium (CGE) model, Gilbert (2003) estimates that a US-Malaysia Free-
Trade Area would generate an increase in welfare (estimated using the equivalent variation technique) 
of $392 million (0.03% of GDP) and $248 million (0.46% of GDP) in the US and Malaysian economies, 
respectively. If these were, indeed, the excepted results, why would either country bother to push for 
 
2 WTO homepage, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm#regional, cited 11 September 2005. 
3 For example, the most popular, traditional technique is the applied Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) approach, 
discussed below, which is mainly (though not always) exclusively tariff- and tariff-equivalent nontariff-barrier driven and ex 
ante in nature. However, as is discussed below, dynamic features have been included in CGE models and they do incorporate 
certain ex post elements, such as calculating potential productivity spillovers. Certain applications of econometric gravity 
models and “import growth approaches” do include (implicitly) nontariff/non-border effects (see Kreinin and Plummer 2002). 
Nevertheless, as these are not structural models, the nontariff/non-border effects are generally intractable..7
an FTA? The answer, of course, lies in the nontariff and non-border issues that the US would like to 
put on the table, and the potential dynamic effects and structural change that Malaysia would like to 
see. But these effects are completely excluded from the formal analysis. Hence, the accord may be 
important to both, while the numbers would suggest otherwise. Moreover, Scollay and Gilbert (2002), 
using the same type of standard Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)-based CGE model, estimate 
that complete g��b�� free �r�de would generate an increase in GDP in Indonesia by a one-time 1.31%, 
hardly politically attractive to policymakers who would have to move the sky and earth to arrive at 
free trade. In sum, rather than making the case for free trade (or FTAs), these models risk doing the 
opposite. 
In addition, most of this economic literature on regionalism has been developed for—and generally 
applied to—developed countries. The same positive and normative analysis that derives from that 
literature generally applies to developing countries as well. But the exclusion of dynamic and non-
border effects in particular could be more problematic in the case of developing countries. For example, 
in addition to the standard allocative effects of regional integration, key areas that are less relevant to 
developed countries but could be extremely important to developing countries include the following:  
 
1. Macroeconomic Stability. There is general consensus in economics that macroeconomic stability 
is critical to the continued success of any development strategy. Even short-term bouts of instability 
can haunt an economy for many years to come; Latin America’s long struggle with inflation is only 
now beginning to be won, and this has been accomplished with considerable economic cost (through 
unemployment and foregone output) and social tension. Promoting macroeconomic stability tends to 
be difficult in developing countries, and external means to support this process are often a necessary 
part of the stabilization process.
In particular, exchange-rate stability is a vital area for the smooth functioning of an economy, particularly 
in the tradable sector. Developing countries tend to rely on variations of fixed exchange-rate regimes for 
a number of reasons, including vulnerability to inflation. What became clear during the Asian financial 
crisis is that the internationalization of these economies, though having many benefits, also expose 
them  more  to  “external  shocks”  originating  abroad  (particularly  for  countries  with  fixed-exchange 
rates). Combined with growing intraregional interdependence, as well as the perception that Asia is 
increasingly performing as a group,4 suggest that there exist strong policy externalities in the region. 
That is, macroeconomic instability created, say, by an asset bubble in one market, could have an 
important effect on the other markets. Hence, closer integration at the real and policy levels imply the 
need for greater cooperation at the macroeconomic level as well. 
Preferential trading arrangements can help encourage macroeconomic stability in a number of ways. In 
particular, real-financial links endemic to preferential trading agreements require stable macroeconomic 
policies if the agreement is to function smoothly. In order to ensure a stable partnership, countries must 
share information, cooperate in advocating stable fiscal and monetary policies, and engage in strong 
“peer pressure” against unstable policies. In advanced (“modern”) regional agreements, countries find 
that they must focus on nontraditional areas affecting trade and investment if they are to advance 
economic integration, including competition policy and government procurement. These “non-border” 
measures force a stronger market orientation, inject greater microeconomic competition by reducing 
the power of domestic monopolies and “rent seeking,” and put constraints on government spending 
through,  say,  the  abolition  of  export  subsidies  and  restrictions  on  industrial  policies.  Thus,  such 
“forced macroeconomic stability” could be highly beneficial to the economic development strategies of 
participating countries.  
4 For example, as ASEAN cooperation deepens, markets begin to view it as one entity. Besides, business cycles in the 
ASEAN countries have become more correlated (see, for example, Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1999 and Kim, Kose, and 
Plummer 2003).8
Box 1: Examples of Dynamic Modeling in Computation General Equilibrium 
(CGE) Models
Empirical evidence shows that an outward-oriented regime is the most effective 
development strategy. This result emanates not only from the static (allocative) effects 
of international policy change in the direction of liberalization, but especially from 
dynamics spillovers of closer economic interaction with the global economy through 
increased trade and investment. Static changes in international prices generate a 
one-time shock to resource allocation. But if trade is linked to changes in productivity, 
far greater gains can be realized.
Through  the  importation  of  capital  equipment,  countries  are  able  to  gain  from 
“embodied” technological progress. As developing countries do most of their trade 
with developed countries, spillovers can be large, albeit a function of the type of inputs, 
specific industry, and the ability of the country to absorb new technologies. Moreover, 
with respect to exports, firms have an increased incentive to adopt new technologies 
because of the marginal increases in the profitability of such investments (Pissarides 
1997). A related effect is that freer international markets force exporting firms to 
become more efficient as they face greater competition. As noted by Dollar (1992; 
pp. 523–  524), “Outward orientation also generally results in more rapid growth of 
exports, and there may be externalities associated with exporting that cause open 
economies to grow more rapidly over long periods of time. There is considerable 
evidence that the process of exporting, combined with easy availability of imported 
inputs and machinery, accelerates technological advance in developing countries.” 
The importance of trade-productivity links is being increasingly appreciated in the 
endogenous growth literature (see, for example, Grossman and Helpman 1993).
One of the more ambitious models in this regard is that of Lewis, Robinson, and 
Wang (1995), who assess the implications of an Asia-Pacific wide free-trade area, 
including estimates with and without trade-productivity links.5 These links take three 
forms: (i) sectoral productivity links to imports of capital goods, with the productivity 
link  determined  by  (fixed)  intermediate  inputs;  (ii)  an  externality  associated  with 
sectoral export growth; and (iii) an aggregate productivity effect in which exports 
increase productivity of the capital stock. Hence, any policy shock that affects trade 
will also affect total factor productivity. These links are embodied in the following 
three equations (we drop country-based script for simplicity):
(1) Imported-input Link: IMi = (TOTMt/TOTM0)ηm * ai + (1-ai)
(2) Sectoral Export Link: SEi = (Ei,t/Ei,0)ηe
(3) Aggregate Export Link: AE= (TOTEt/TOTE0)η    
where ai is the share of intermediate inputs in production; ηm, ηe, and η correspond 
to  the  relevant  “productivity  elasticities”,  E  and  M  refer  to  exports  and  imports, 
respectively; and subscripts t and 0 represent the experiment and base periods, 
respectively. For the productivity-linked simulations, Equations 1-3 are fed into sector 
production functions and the aggregate capital stock according to Equations 4 and 
5, respectively:9
(4) Sectoral Production Function: Xi = IMi * SEi [Σf αi,f Fi,f -γi,f ] -1/γi,f  
(5) Aggregate Capital Stock: FSt = FS0 * AE
where  Fi,f,  Xi,  and  FS  denote  sectoral  factor  inputs,  sectoral  output,  and  the 
economy-wide capital stock, respectively. Hence, it is apparent from Equation 5 that 
the externality associated with aggregate exports is “embodied” as an increase in the 
base-period capital stock. 
While in all simulations Lewis, et al estimate fairly small gains from an Asia-
Pacific free-trade area, the productivity-linked results tend to be much higher 
than the de-linked simulations, especially for developing countries (for example, 
productivity links increase the gains by over eight-fold in the case of the resource-
rich ASEAN countries, whereas Japan and Asia’s newly industrialized countries 
(NIEs) experience less than doubling of their gains).
For foreign direct investment (FDI), existing CGE models that attempt to include foreign 
investment do so by fashioning it as an additional factor of production responding to 
relative changes in rates of return, either between countries or between countries 
and sectors. Brown (1994) uses an imperfect competition model with investment 
flows in which returns to both labor and capital can change in the same direction 
with an economic policy shock. Hence, a labor-abundant country applying a tariff in 
a differentiated-products model generates an increase in the rate of return to both 
scarce and abundant factors of production (this is contrary to the Stolper-Samuelson 
prediction). Inflow of capital to this country could render it more similar to its trading 
partner in terms of relative factor abundance, suggesting that factor flows and trade 
may become complementary. A tariff will attract capital flows, but it will actually harm 
the tariff-imposing country, as the repatriation of profits forces deterioration in the 
terms of trade. The investing country actually gains.
This result follows from the fact that growth is not endogenous in the model so the 
rise in capital flows does not create a new steady-state growth path for the economy, 
from which the tariff-imposing country could gain. Baldwin and Seghezza (1996b) 
incorporate an endogenous growth in their analysis. In a static (competitive) model 
with foreign investment, an increase in tariffs on capital-intensive goods in a labor 
abundant country will raise the return to capital. This leads to a “trade-induced, 
investment-led”  permanent  shock  to  steady-state  growth,  which  would  generate 
support for the import-substitution paradigm for developing countries. However, given 
the abundance of stylized facts contradicting this approach, alternative variants yield 
conflicting results.
Policymakers and academics agree that FDI is instrumental in boosting the economic 
development  process  by  fostering  human  capital  development,  introducing  new 
management systems, bringing in “embodied” technologies, providing ready-made 
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5 Lewis, et al base their model on information available through GTAP, with the exception of additional information on 
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external  markets,  and  other  positive  influences.  One  such  model,  developed  by 
Haddad and Harrison (1993), uses panel data for Morocco’s manufacturing sector to 
check for positive FDI spillovers. Foreign firms are found to exhibit higher levels of 
total factor productivity than domestic firms, but a slower rate of productivity growth. 
Their study offers insight into how one might go about modeling the effects of FDI.
First, in order to gauge the importance of foreign presence for productivity, they 
estimate the following general form equation:
(6) uij = f (FDI_Firmij, FDI_Sectorj, SIZEij),
where uij denotes productivity of firm in sector j; FDI_Firmij refers to the share of 
foreign assets in firm i in sector j; FDI_Sectorj is the importance of FDI in sector 
j; and SIZEij is a measure of the size of the firm. Positive estimated coefficients 
for FDI_Firmij suggest that joint ventures exhibit less deviation from best practice 
relative to domestic firms, and the same results for SIZEij suggests that larger firms 
achieve  higher  levels  of  productivity.  Finally,  a  positive  coefficient  of  the  sector 
variable suggests that a larger foreign presence in the sector corresponds to higher 
levels of productivity, for example, because  of greater competition. Haddad  and 
Harrison (1994) estimate positive (and statistically significant) signs for each of these 
variables.
Next, they use an aggregate production function to gauge the implications of foreign 
investment for productivity growth:
(7) d log Yijt = a FDI_Firmijt+ b FDI_Sectorjt+ c Cj + d Dj + al d log Lijt + ak d 
logKijt, 
where Cj and Dj are sector and time binary variables, respectively. Productivity growth 
varies across sectors and time, as well as being a function of the level of foreign 
investment in firms and sectors. Statistical results from estimation of Equation 7 are 
poor; the independent variables explain only about 40% of the variance in output, 
and the FDI variables are each statistically insignificant. The coefficient on foreign 
investment at the firm level is negative but statistically insignificant.
Finally, led in part by the seminal work of Paul Romer (1986), there has been a 
resurgence of interest in economic growth theory, especially in endogenous growth 
models. Endogenous growth theory lends itself to the type of analysis put forth in 
CGE models. The links between trade- and FDI-related productivity growth were 
examined above; but applications of endogenous growth theory would provide a 
better idea of how to link productivity changes to economic growth over time.
Recognizing  the  importance  but  great  difficulties  associated  with  incorporating 
endogenous growth into CGE models, Kehoe (1992) notes that differences in capital/
labor  ratios  cannot  explain  large  differences  in  output  per  worker,  say,  between 
Canada, Mexico, and US. In trying to explain these differences, he develops a model 
in which learning by doing (through increases in specialization in manufacturing) 
influences growth of output-per-worker, as does the ability to trade in specialized 
products. In the endogenous growth tradition, he develops and estimates a model of 
the following form:
(8) gj=α + β1logYj + β2log(Xj1/Xj)2 + β3log GLj + β4logyj + β5PRIMj + ej,
where gj is average annual growth of manufacturing output per worker; Yj is base-
period manufacturing output; the sum over all (Xj1/Xj)2 is a specialization index (he 
uses exports at the 3-digit SITC level; this is the proxy for “learning by doing” through 
specialization); GLj is the Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade (proxying the 
ability of a country to trade in highly-differentiated products); and yj and PRIMj are 
base-period  per  capita  income  and  primary-school  enrolment  rates,  respectively 
(each a typical explanatory variable in endogenous growth models). Results from 
a cross-section of countries over the period 1970–1985 period yields statistically-
significant and expected signs for all estimated coefficients. The size of β3 is high 
and lead Kehoe to conclude that Mexico could increase its growth in output per 
worker by 1.656% annually through greater specialization. He then calculates that 
after 25 years Mexico’s output per worker would be over 50% higher than otherwise 
would have been the case.
2. Technology Transfer and FDI. The link between FDI and technology transfer has been firmly 
established (see Box 1 for a formal example of this link). It is one of the primary reasons why countries in 
Asia and elsewhere have consistently sought ways to lure FDI inflows—including through unilateral and 
concerted trade liberalization. Regional integration is one means to attract such long-term investment 
flows by creating a more integrated marketplace within which multinationals can exploit product-level 
economies of scale and enjoy a regional division of labor with low transactions costs. It is often said 
that AFTA itself is more of an investment agreement than a trade agreement, in that it is designed to 
enhance inward FDI more than intraregional trade flows. The Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) 
Executive Summary Series No. S58/52 (ADBI 2002) identifies FDI as a prominent motivation for FTAs, 
noting that it constitutes a key “dynamic effect.”
In the implementation of regional integration agreements, large locational advantages 
and  environmental  change  could  result  in  substantial  impacts  on  the  regional 
distribution of FDIs. In particular, technological change and other efficiencies should 
strengthen the positive linkages between regional agreements and intraregional FDI 
flows. (p.1)
The relationship between trade and technology transfer (also see Box 1) is less well known than that 
of FDI and technology transfer, or at least less well appreciated. Through trade liberalization, countries 
are also able to stimulate technological development. For example, trade leads to the adaptations 
of new technologies from abroad by increasing the potential for success in using these technologies 
to crack foreign markets; in addition, increased competition forces domestic firms to place a higher 
priority on creating their own or importing new technologies (Pissarides 1997). This implies a strong 
incentive for developing countries emphasizing technology transfer (such as ASEAN) to liberalize even 
unilaterally. 
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Mai (et al) estimate the potential effects of an Australia-PRC FTA, combining both ex ante (liberaliza-
tion of trade in goods and services) and FDI, in which changes in FDI and its implications on produc-
tivity are in part derived from ex post estimates using PRC data. Relative to a “business as usual” 
benchmark, the study estimates an increase in GDP of 3.3% and 6.7% for Australia and the PRC, 
respectively. These are obviously not large results but are impressive if one considers the sectoral 
trading patterns of the two countries and the relative size of their bilateral trade and investment. 
Moreover, to best take advantage of these new technologies, countries find that they must establish 
strong intellectual property protection laws and the means to enforce them. Without an attractive, 
protective environment in which multinationals can operate and in which domestic firms can invest in 
new innovations, the process of technology transfer is significantly inhibited. Formal free-trade areas 
can help in creating a strong underlying framework for the protection of intellectual property and “peer 
pressure” in the implementation of associated laws.
When developing countries team up with developed countries in an FTA, they are also specifically 
able to encourage technology transfer, either through internal promotional means (in terms of train-
ing facilities, regional research and academic institutes, and research consortia for example) or in 
jointly devising means to bring in appropriate technologies from abroad. The US-Singapore FTA, for 
example, tries to remove barriers to greater cooperation in higher education and the establishment of 
foreign universities. 
3. Structural Policy Change and Reform. Related to points 1 and 2 above are various reforms in 
developing countries that are not directly pertinent to trade or even investment/financial flows per se, 
but are essential to the modernization and competitiveness of an economic system. While often advo-
cated by economists and technocrats, these reforms often do not find special interest groups within the 
body politic that are able to push them. And as they tend to be controversial (with clear losers), they are 
difficult to promote, even if the economic gains from increased competitiveness are clear. Examples 
include the need for better laws related to corporate (and public) governance; competitions policy, in-
cluding reform of state-owned enterprises, financial and other services; and other “sensitive sectors” 
with important links to the rest of the economy.
Regional integration can help promote reforms in these areas by providing the rigor of a formal accord. 
Because developing countries need these reforms more than most developed countries, regional in-
tegration can therefore generate greater gains. For example, the creation of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the US-Canada Free Trade Area arguably made relatively little progress in pro-
moting structural reforms, as these agreements were between developed countries. However, when 
the EEC took on Greece, Portugal, and Spain in the 1980s, these countries—which were really “newly 
industrialized” rather than developed—made significant gains in terms of structural reforms, leading to 
greater competitiveness and productivity (outside agriculture, in any case). The same can be said of 
Mexico in NAFTA; while it has a long way to go before becoming a truly “developed” economy, Mexico 
has made great progress in providing a more stable economic framework, modernizing and liberalizing 
previously undeveloped sectors (such as financial services, which now has significant foreign penetra-
tion), and increasing productivity. 
This eventual necessity of “teeth” in formal regional accords will be difficult in the Asian context, which 
has demonstrated a revealed preference for loose, informal accords. However, progress in this area 
will be essential to promote “deep” integration. As will be discussed at length below, developing Asian 
countries are being forced to accept “hard” formal bilateral OECD-country accords anyway. In partial 
recognition of this exigency, ASEAN itself is moving in the direction of greater formality, including the 3
Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN Charter (12 December 2005), which articulates the desire of 
ASEAN Member Countries to make ASEAN a legal entity and support its institutional framework.6
4. Harmonization Issues.  The largest effects of the Single Market program in the EU were gauged to 
be in many of the “non-border areas” mentioned above, but, perhaps one of the most important areas 
of cooperation can be classified under the rubric of “harmonization issues,” such as product testing, 
professional certification, standards conformance, customs and transit, and so forth. Gains in all of 
these areas would be maximized by adopting global harmonization standards. Nevertheless, doing so 
at the global level is much more difficult, particularly for developing countries, which often feel threat-
ened by such programs. By conforming as a group to some global standards, the agreement clearly 
reinforces the global system. But even when they do not, such agreements will reduce the “stock of 
divergencies,” making global agreements that much more feasible. 
5. Political-Economy and Policy Issues. Most existing preferential trading arrangements were either 
created as economic arrangements in support of political goals or at least were consistent with the 
diplomatic strategy of the founding countries. Economic cooperation in these arrangements is seen as 
an important vehicle through which political goals can be pursued (which in themselves have impor-
tant economic ramifications). The EU has been effective in using preferential trading arrangements as 
diplomatic tools over the past 40 years, in part out of necessity: commercial policy was the only unified 
policy at the regional level (Messerlin 2001).
To the extent that these regional accords add to the political stability of the region, they do service to 
economic development in general and the goal of policy reform in particular, even if they are gener
ally weak in substance. This, of course, is an important part of the early success story of ASEAN. Al-
though most ASEAN countries had only recently achieved independence and were struggling to create 
nation states (complete with resolving territorial disputes), the arrangement established an important 
dialogue process that prevented overt hostilities to break out. To say that the (intentionally) weak eco-
nomic cooperation initiatives in ASEAN had nothing to do with the subsequent dynamic growth in the 
region is to seriously understate its role.17 
Today, Asia is developing its own identity in terms of strategic economic policy and diplomatic rela-
tions. It is unwise to compare the emerging reality of economic cooperation in Asia with the process in 
Europe: Asia today is in a far different subjective historical context. However, Europe has always pro-
vided an “economic cooperation guide” to ASEAN and Asia in general. Asian countries have (wisely) 
not copied the European experience, but rather have adapted it within their own special context and 
at their own pace. But the pace is quickening; as we will note at length below, regional accords in Asia 
have been booming in terms of numbers and membership (“horizontal integration”) as well as in terms 
of product, sector, and policy coverage. The decision to create an “ASEAN Economic Community” 
(AEC) by the ASEAN leaders was a conscious attempt to signal the fact that ASEAN intended to pur-
sue a single market along the lines of the EU, albeit with ASEAN characteristics. For example, while 
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6 The Declaration states that: ”The ASEAN Charter will codify all ASEAN norms, rules, and values and reaffirm that 
ASEAN agreements signed and other instruments adopted before the establishment of the ASEAN Charter shall con-
tinue to apply and be legally binding where appropriate.....The ASEAN Charter will reaffirm principles, goals and ideals 
contained in ASEAN’s milestone agreements, in particular the ASEAN Declaration (1967), the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976), the Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (1995), the ASEAN 
Vision 2020 (1997) and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (2003) as well as the principles of inter-state relations 
in accordance with the UN Charter and established international law that promote and protect ASEAN community 
interests as well as inter-state relations and the national interests of the individual ASEAN Member Countries... the 
ASEAN Charter will confer a legal personality to ASEAN and determine the functions, develop areas of competence 
of key ASEAN bodies and their relationship with one another in the overall ASEAN structure.” http://www.aseansec.
org/18030.htm.
17 Naya and Plummer (1991).4
the Single Market in Europe set out to create a common market in which goods, services, capital, and 
labor would flow, the AEC’s goals are less ambitious; especially with respect to the free flow of labor 
(even the most ambitious proposals exclude unskilled labor). 
In sum, while regionalism is a second-best policy, there is reason to believe that bilateral and plurilat-
eral accords could potentially generate far greater gains than standard models would suggest, given 
the critical importance of dynamic and non-border/policy changes that are inherent in such accords. 
Moreover, developing countries in Asia stand to gain relatively more from these “deep” policies than 
developed countries, provided that the region’s FTAs are open; trade creating rather than trade divert-
ing (the regional division of labor that emerges from the accord is consistent with comparative advan-
tage); and other regulatory and non-border conditions, discussed below, are met.  
II. Bilateral and Regional Accords in Asia
a. A Brief Review of Economic Integration in Asia
There have been many excellent surveys of regional economic integration in Asia (for example, Kawai 
2005, Naya 2002, ADB 2002). Hence, we give a brief review of the evolution of regional accords in 
Asia, leaving more detailed reviews to these authoritative sources.  We will instead concentrate on the 
analysis of the components of existing accords in the next subsection.
We might begin by considering what lies behind the contemporary regionalism trend in East Asia, 
which has been by far the most active area in Asia and the Pacific. We do not include in this survey 
economic cooperation among the Pacific Islands, which tends to be a very special case of regional 
cooperation (for analysis of Pacific economic cooperation and recommendations for the future, see the 
October 2005 Asian Development Bank/Commonwealth Secretariat Joint Report to the Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat, Towards a New Pacific Regionalism), but we do consider South Asia and Central 
Asia. 
Briefly, we would first suggest several factors influencing the regionalism trend in East Asia that 
stem directly from the Asian financial crisis, including: (i) the obvious contagion relationships, which 
demonstrated the policy externalities across countries in ASEAN and the NIEs; (ii) major disappointment 
with respect to the US reaction to the crisis, leaving the feeling of “being in it alone together,” (iii) 
disappointing  progress  in APEC  in  achieving  closer  trade  and  financial  cooperation,  as  well  as 
development assistance cooperation (“ECOTECH”); (iv) Japan’s offer to create an Asian Monetary 
Fund during the crisis—opposed by the IMF and the US—gave the impression that Japan wanted 
to be proactive in the region; (v) arguably, the PRC decision not to devalue during this period also 
created a sense of solidarity; (vi) the “New Miyazawa Plan,” launched in October 1998 which dedicated 
$30 billion to help spur recovery in East Asia (and deemed highly successful),18 and (vii) the policies 
promulgated by the IMF to solve the crisis were deemed inappropriate, giving greater credibility to the 
“Asian approach.” 
Hence, the crisis itself set the stage for serious and durable East Asian regionalism. There are many 
other internal and external forces at work that have expedited the process, such as the rise of region-
alism globally and its potential negative effects on the region; the successful example of the Single 
Market Program in Europe and, eventually, monetary union; general pessimism regarding what can be 
achieved at the WTO in light of failure to move forward at the Seattle and Cancun WTO Ministerials; 
and the potential inherent benefits of FTAs. 
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Table 1 gives a chronology of arguably the most important Asian initiatives in terms of preferential trad-
ing arrangements,9 financial cooperation, and plans for widening and deepening economic integra-
tion. ASEAN economic cooperation features as the most prominent of the regional accords, constitut-
ing by far the most important initiatives prior to the Asian crisis, but East-Asia-wide initiatives, such as 
the “ASEAN Plus Three” (ASEAN+3) accords, are taking on greater importance over time.  
Despite the many early agreements in ASEAN’s history that were mainly political and token in nature,20 
its first major initiative was AFTA (1992). With the exception of the Japan-Singapore FTA (“Japan-Sin-
gapore Economic Partnership Agreement”, or JSEPA), which began implementation over 10 years 
later, AFTA is the only example of cooperation in Asia that is similar in concept to NAFTA. However, in 
true ASEAN fashion, rather than overly commit to regional integration in sensitive areas, the specif-
ics of AFTA were purposefully left somewhat ambiguous, with the agreement basically committing the 
ASEAN members to free trade in a 15-year timeframe. Also, the definition of “free trade” was some-
what loose, as it included tariffs in the range of 0–5%, rather than the traditional 0%t.2  After the original 
agreement, ASEAN broadened the scope of goods covered by AFTA and the period of implementa-
tion shortened such that AFTA was technically in full effect at the beginning of 2004 for the original 
five ASEAN countries and Brunei Darussalam, though there are transitional periods for products on 
the temporary exclusion lists (for example, sensitive products such as rice and automobiles in some 
cases) and some country-specific implementation problems in certain areas. The original target for full 
implementation was 2006 for Viet Nam, 2008 for Lao PDR and Myanmar, and 2010 for Cambodia. Re-
cently, ASEAN decided to speed up the process to complete AFTA fully in 2007. ASEAN has also made 
important strides in investment cooperation—in the form of ASEAN “one-stop investment centers” and 
the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA).22 These efforts at industrial cooperation have been designed with 
essentially the same goal in mind as AFTA: reduce transactions costs associated with intraregional 
economic interaction.  
In November 2002, the ASEAN Heads of Government—meeting in Phnom Penh—proposed that the 
region should consider the possible creation of an “ASEAN Economic Community” (AEC) by 2020. At 
the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, December 2005, ASEAN leaders discussed the possibility 
of expediting the AEC process, to complete it in 2015 (with flexibility for new member countries). 
The name of the AEC is significant, for an “Economic Community” brings to mind the European experi-
ence. In fact, when APEC was “re-inventing” itself, it was proposed that the words behind the acronym 
for “Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation” should be replaced with “Asia-Pacific Economic Community.” 
This idea was rejected explicitly because it would give the impression that APEC was intending to 
move in the direction of the EC model, which was thought to be too controversial. The ASEAN leaders 
actually agreed, at the Bali ASEAN Summit in October 2003, to create a region in which goods, ser-
vices, capital, and skilled labor would flow freely, though the details remain to be worked out.  
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9 This review is based in part on material in Naya and Plummer (2005). 
20 For example, the Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA), was a positive-list approach to trade liberalization with small 
margins of preference and limited product coverage, expanded somewhat during the 1980s, but with no real impact on 
trade. Industrial cooperation, such as the ASEAN Industrial Project (AIP) system, never really got off the ground. 
2 In fact, this range of tariffs probably contradicts the requirements spelled out in Article XXIV of the GATT/WTO, but, 
as was noted earlier, ASEAN benefits from the Enabling Clause, which has always freed it from these constraints.
22 A salient component of the AIA is the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) Scheme, which offers more in terms 
of tariff (0–5%) and nontariff incentives than the traditional industrial cooperation programs. Moreover, the ASEAN 
countries created the ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (September 1996), which 
includes simplification of investment procedures and approval processes, as well as enhanced transparency and pre-
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The reasons behind the decision to create the AEC are many, including the (i) desire to create a 
comprehensive post-AFTA agenda; (ii) a perceived need to deepen economic integration in ASEAN in 
light of the new international commercial environment, especially the dominance of FTAs; (iii) given (ii), 
the possibility that bilateral FTAs could actually jeopardize ASEAN integration as all member-states are 
free to pursue their own commercial-policy agenda; and (iv) the recognition since the Asian financial 
crisis that cooperation in the real and financial sectors must be extended concomitantly, and that free 
flows of skilled labor will be necessary to do this.23
The effective design and implementation of the AEC pose major challenges to ASEAN. While the 
European experience would suggest that considerable gains can be made from the creation of a single 
market,24 the diversity and level of economic development of the ASEAN members render even the 
creation of a customs union—an essential feature of any single market—extremely complex, at least 
in terms of political-economy-related issues. For example, most transitional ASEAN members continue 
to have relatively protected markets, whereas Singapore is the one of the most open economies in the 
world, having an average tariff of essentially zero.25 How can one erect an ASEAN Common External 
Tariff with such great dispersion in tariff rates across countries? Perhaps the end-game will be free 
trade—a Common External Tariff of zero—which would be applauded by economists and, in fact, would 
not be foreign to ASEAN thinking on issues related to economic integration.26 Moreover, the transition 
period is, in effect, relatively long: 9 years (at a minimum, assuming the 205 date for the completion 
of the AEC is accepted) for the more developed ASEAN countries should be a sufficient amount of time 
to allow for the necessary structural adjustment and the maturing of any “infant industries,” assuming 
they exist.27 However, embracing pure “open regionalism” and a tariff-free zone will be a politically 
difficult albeit noble fight. In any event, the ASEAN leaders are serious about creating the AEC and, in 
fact, are currently studying options as to how a customs union in ASEAN might best be formed.
As noted above, despite the progress under APEC, there is a general impression that APEC lags far 
behind the implementation of its ambitious agenda. Given the new international and Asian zeal for 
regionalism, it would appear that most countries have put APEC on the back burner and are consid-
ering other options. Indirectly, the idea of creating an East-Asia only economic grouping seems to be 
gaining new interest in the form of the ASEAN+3-related initiatives.  The first East Asian Summit in 
December 2005 testifies to this trend. 
In addition to the “APEC ebb,” there were several events that shifted the focus to East Asia. First, 
even with the successful APEC Summits at Blake Island and Bogor, the East Asian Economic Group-
ing (EAEG) concept never faded away. On the contrary, it began to grow in substance. Strangely, the 
initiative came from ASEAN’s effort to expand economic cooperation with the EU, but the EU’s desire 
to deal with all of East Asia led to ASEAN’s asking PRC, Japan, and Korea to participate.  The first 
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23 The free flow of all labor, including unskilled labor, was deemed too politically difficult to consider in the AEC. 
24 For in-depth analysis of the lessons of the EU’s Single Market Program for ASEAN, see Plummer (forthcoming 
2006)..
25 The only real exception relates to positive tariffs on beverages. Also, we might note that Singapore’s bound tariffs 
are greater than zero. 
26 For example, there was a proposal prior to the Asian financial crisis, sponsored by the Philippines with support of 
some other ASEAN countries, to multilateralize tariff cuts within AFTA, which would have precluded trade diversion 
and, in fact, would have eventually made ASEAN a free-trade zone. This proposal was dropped during the Asian 
financial crisis and has not been taken up again, but will no doubt naturally surface as plans for the AEC begin to 
materialize.
27 From a practical point of view, it should be noted that a deadline of 2015 (or 2020, for that matter) will not be 
etched in stone: no doubt flexibility in the more delicate sectors will be permitted. The European Single Market Pro-
gram had 1992 as a deadline (hence the sobriquet, “EC 1992”); however, it was not until 1994 that the lion’s share 
of the relevant directives had been implemented among EU member. Further, some of the sectors continue to defy 
integration, especially in finance and energy. 17
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was held in Bangkok in March 1996, which was to initiate a process 
of informal economic, political, and cultural cooperation. ASEM includes a Heads of State Summit 
every 2 years, with the Fifth Summit being held in Viet Nam in October 2004. Membership in ASEM 
includes the 25 members of the EU and ASEAN+3. Even though the initial impetus for these meet-
ings was economic cooperation with the EU, the significance for East Asian regionalism lies in that 
these meetings brought officials from ASEAN, PRC, Japan, and Korea together to discuss issues of 
economic cooperation. 
The original “Miyazawa Plan” was initiated by Japan during the Asian financial crisis to create an 
Asian Monetary Fund to supplement the IMF. It was opposed by the IMF and the US, but eventually 
led to the establishment of currency swap arrangements among East Asian countries (basically bi-
lateral swaps between Japan and individual countries— the Chiang Mai Agreement) during the 2000 
ADB annual meeting. 
However, financial integration in general is a complicated process. Usually it occurs well into the 
process of regional integration, as suggested by the experiences of the EU and the creation of the 
euro, which was only possible after decades of a customs union and a common market. Because 
the benefits of monetary cooperation are less clear—particularly in the Asian case, as exchange rate 
stability among Asian countries is of limited value for the many countries that trade heavily outside 
the region—and the political benefits are far less obvious than in the EU case, countries have begun 
to focus more on FTAs, at least as a first step. 
APEC’s lack of influence in the Asian financial crisis has served to solidify East Asia’s move in favor 
of an ASEAN+3 approach. The current spate of agreements, however, has not been extended to all 
ASEAN+3, but rather has come more from ASEAN to individual countries. For example, the comple-
tion of the PRC-ASEAN joint FTA study in the summer of 2001 prompted Japan to quickly initiate a 
study of its own with ASEAN. One month later, at the 2001 ASEAN+3 meeting in November, ASEAN 
and the PRC announced the intention to negotiate a free trade area within 0 years (the agreement 
was formalized in a Framework Agreement in December 2004, discussed below).
In short, regional integration in East Asia began with ASEAN economic cooperation, and recent 
initiatives have involved ASEAN countries but in a wider context. We might call this the ASEAN+3 
approach but, in effect, actual accords have actually been more in the form of “ASEAN+1.” Moreover, 
while there may be grand designs for integrating East Asia, bilateral accords with nonregional part-
ners have been flourishing since 2002. Some have seen this in a negative light; however, as will be 
discussed below, in a way it merely underscores the “openness” of the regional movement in East 
Asia. An Asia-only bloc akin to the EU is not in the cards. In this, the region may be able to avoid 
the shortcomings of the European experience, and Asia countries will be freer to focus rather on the 
gains from economic integration.
Regional cooperation in South Asia and Central Asia has been modest at best, at least relative to 
East Asia. The reasons for this are many but from the economic standpoint relate mainly to the time-
path and direction of industrialization policy. East Asia became an early convert of outward-oriented 
industrialization and has been a leader in the developing world with respect to trade and investment 
liberalization. South Asia has been a reluctant disciple of the “liberal” model; in fact, it can be argued 
that up until this past decade South Asian countries have generally been reluctant reformers, though 
the record differs by country. It has only been recently that India, whose commercial policy position 
is critical to the region’s policy path, has embraced sustained outward-oriented reforms (though even 
today this process has been a difficult one in the world’s largest democracy). Central Asia, on the 
other hand, frozen until 1991 in the Second World of the USSR, only in the past decade has been 
fitfully carrying out its transition agenda, with highly-divergent approaches (and success) across the 
region. Kyrgyz Republic, for example, is a member of the WTO and has a relatively open economy, 
whereas Tajikistan and Uzbekistan continue to be notoriously closed.18
It comes as no wonder, then, that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)28 
and  the  Economic  Cooperation  Organization  (ECO)29  have  made  little  progress  traditionally  in 
real economic cooperation. Their piecemeal “positive list” approaches have been geared more at 
strengthening confidence and supporting political dialogue, rather than genuine efforts at regional 
integration. This may change in the near future, at least in South Asia, with the peace process opening 
up many possibilities at the same time outward-oriented policy change is taking root. The ECO region is 
far more complex in terms of its matrix of national economic policies and will likely require considerable 
time before any effective integration takes place. After all, the priority for these countries is first WTO 
accession (only a few—Pakistan, Turkey, and, as noted above, Kyrgyz Republic—are already WTO 
members but all have applied to join and are at various phases in the accession process) and they 
have a long way to go in terms of commercial policy liberalization (particularly in terms of nontariff and 
non-border areas). Moreover, their factor endowments are similar and geared toward inter-industry 
trade, leaving little prospect of boosting intraregional trade effectively.30 
Table 1: Chronology of Asian Integration: ASEAN and ASEAN+3
Main Points: ASEAN




. Established ASEAN   
    Secretariat
2. Treaty of Amity: Mutual 
    Respect for 
    independence,  
    sovereignty, equality,   
    territorial integrity and 
    identity of nations, i.e. 
    non interference
3.Establishment of Zone 
   of Peace, Freedom, And 
   Neutrality
st-Bali 1976
1. ASEAN Industrial 
    Projects agreed
2. Preferential Trading 





2. Accelerate and make 
    more flexible ASEAN 
    Industrial Joint Venture 
    (AIJV)
3rd-Manila 1987
1. ASEAN Free Trade Area 
    (AFTA)
2. Common Effective 
    Preferential Tariff 





28 SAARC member-states include: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
29 ECO members include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
30 Intraregional trade in the ECO region comes to about 7%.9
5th-Bangkok 995
1. Proposal for ASEAN 





2. ASEAN 2020 presented, 
    a broad long-term vision  
    for ASEAN in 2020 (with 
    ASEAN Economic 







st ASEAN+3 (ChinaPRC, Japan, and Korea) ChinaPRC, Japan, and Korea) PRC, Japan, and Korea)
Hanoi Plan of Action 
adopted to move towards 
Vision 2020:
1. Advance AFTA to 2002, 
    90% intra-trade subject 
to 
    0-5% tariff
2. ASEAN Investment 
    Area (AIA)-goal 
investment 
    liberalization within by 
    ASEAN 200, outside 
    ASEAN by 2020
3. ASEAN Surveillance 
    Process
4.Eminent Persons Group 
    (EPG) proposed to come 
    up with plan for ASEAN 
    Vision 2020
6th- Hanoi 1998 2nd-Hanoi -East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) proposed by Kim 
Dae Jung, President of Korea to look into East Asian 
Integration
EPG develops plan for 
Vision 2020:
1. Concern that ASEAN 
    not effective in 
responding 
    to Asian financial crisis, 
    so proposed financial 
    cooperation.
2. Speed up AFTA
3. Accelerate AIA 
4. To respond to surge 
    of PRC, need to become 
    more competitive, attract 
    investment, faster 
    integration, and promote 





Adopted Initiative for 
ASEAN Integration (IAI):
1. Framework for more 
    developed ASEAN 
    members to assist those 
    less-developed 
members 
    in need
2. Focus on factors to 
    enhance 
competitiveness 
    for new economy:
    education, skills 
    development, and work 






-East Asian Study Group (EASG) to 
 consider EAFTA and agree to hold 
 East Asian Summit
-Two major ideas: 1) Development of 
  institutional link between Southeast  
  Asia and East Asia 2) Study group 
  for merit of an East Asian Free 
  Trade Area (EAFTA) and investment 
  area
-Begin financial cooperation, ex. 
 Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) May 
 2000. By March 2006, bilateral swap 
 arrangements under the CMI came 
 to $71.5 billion.
-Propose Expert Group Study on 
  ASEAN-PRC FTA
- Challenges facing 
ASEAN: 
  Declining FDI, erosion of   
  competitiveness.
- Road map for Integration 
for  
  ASEAN to achieve 2020
-Go beyond AFTA and 
  AIA by deepening market 
  liberalization for both 
trade 
  and investment
7th-Brunei 200 5th-Brunei -Endorse EAVG recommendation 
 for EAFTA but overshadowed by 
 PRC-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
 proposal within 0 years, with the 
 adoption Early Harvest Provision to 
 speed up FTA
-Prompted by PRC-ASEAN FTA 
 proposal, Prime Minister Koizumi 
 proposed Japan-ASEAN Economic 
 Partnership in reaction to PRC-
 ASEAN proposal
-Japan-Singapore Agreement for a 
 New Age Partnership singed 
 January 2002 and enforced Summer 
 2002






Adopt EASG recommendations of deepening and 
broadening of East Asian integration. ASEAN+3 
Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI) endorsed by 










PRC speeds up FTA with ASEAN from 205 to 200
Notes:1. In 1998, 1999, and 2000 PRC speeches always contained the idea of advising ASEAN. It is difficult to imagine this 
from leaders of other countries, like Japan and Korea. 
S�ur�e﻽﻽ Adopted from Naya and Plummer (2005).2
b. Existing Accords: A Survey
In this subsection, we give a brief review of the various FTAs and related framework agreements 
that have been established in Asia. The flurry of negotiations makes it quite difficult to keep up with 
pr�p��ed FTAs, which tend to start off with a bilateral trade agreement and/or a formal framework 
agreement. Given that our ultimate goal will be to see to what degree these agreements conform to 
a “building bloc” or “outward-oriented” approach to commercial policy, we do not include these in this 
study, as the results are not yet known. For a July 2005 survey of various accords in the Asia-Pacific 
region, see Feridhanusetyawan 2005.3 
The texts of modern Asian FTAs are complicated and can be quite diverse, though there tends to be 
considerable overlap in terms of topics addressed. To simplify the task of reviewing these accords, 
we group them into three different types, Full FTAs; Limited FTAs; and Framework Agreements, and 
summarize their salient components in Table 2. There can be significant variation within each of these 
groupings, but we will get more into a taxonomical review of their coverage and depth in Section IV.  
Full FTAs tend to be highly comprehensive, covering both goods and services, and usually investment. 
A good benchmark for Full FTAs are Singapore’s bilateral agreements with developed countries, which 
are all advanced, as is clear from Table 2 (and discussed below). Limited FTAs usually contain a positive 
list of goods and/or services that are accorded tariff preferences, to be expanded gradually. They 
tend to be a first step toward stronger integration. As far as Framework Agreements are concerned, 
those that involve ASEAN stipulate objectives to strengthen and enhance cooperation on economic, 
trade, and investment matters, to liberalize progressively and promote trade and to facilitate the more 
effective integration of newer ASEAN members. In general, they lay the foundation for negotiations in 
future FTAs.  
There appears to be general conformity on issues undertaken in negotiations under Full FTAs. Hence, 
in Table 2 we do not detail all possible features of these agreements (in order to save space). Other 
components that emerge in these agreements include (i) abolition of tariffs and nontariff barriers on 
included projects32; (ii) anti-dumping provisions; (iii) customs procedures, essentially modeled on “best 
practices,” (iv) professional services (either with details included specifically in the agreements or as 
a framework for future negotiation); (v) dispute-settlement mechanisms (of various degrees of detail); 
and (vi) balance of payments safeguards, generally referring to IMF protocols and the GATT 1994 
“Understanding on Balance of Payments Provisions.”  
Some salient observations regarding the components of these agreements follows:
•  1. As the only major subregional initiative in East Asia, AFTA is unique in many ways. We have 
classified it here as a “Full FTA,” but this might be controversial. AFTA continues to be a fairly 
“loose” agreement, with extensive coverage of goods but limited real coverage of anything 
aside from investment, and investment is covered under the AIA/AIC agreements—outside 
of, but obviously related to, AFTA. There is an ASEAN Framework on Services (AFS), but 
its coverage continues to be relatively limited. In fact, creating essentially a free market in 
services under the AEC would merely be a matter of building on the AFS. AFTA’s protection of 
 
3An adequate summary of the results of the various empirical models examining the economic effects of these ar-
rangements is beyond the scope of this study, though we do include references to specific, pertinent studies. For a 
summary of the effects of various initiatives, see Feridhanusetyawan 2005, Naya and Plummer 2005, and Scollay 
and Gilbert 2002. 
32 With the exception of AFTA, this implies an abolition of tariffs and nontariff barriers for included projects, which in 
the case of Full FTAs tends to be fairly comprehensive. AFTA is an exception in that it defines free trade to be tariffs 
of 0-5%.22
intellectual property rights (IPR) essentially refers to WTO trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights (TRIPS). The monitoring and enforcement mechanisms still need to be worked 
out properly before true “deep integration” emerges; settlements within AFTA at present tend to 
be �d h��. However, the region does have a liberal approach to rules of origin, generally with 
an across-the-board 40% minimum. Further, deepening other areas of cooperation, including 
financial areas and skilled labor, are slated to be included in the AEC blueprint, in ASEAN+3 and 
even APEC initiatives. The history of ASEAN, the complicated nature of its membership, the 
dominance of its trade and investment partners situated outside the subregion, and its position 
at the heart of East Asia will ensure that additional deepening within the context of AFTA and 
the AEC will be colored by developments at the ASEAN+3, APEC, and ASEM levels.
Table 2: Asian Bilateral and Plurilateral Accords
Year Partners Type Main Features
992 ASEAN (AFTA) Full FTA Not fully comprehensive; fairly simple ROO; separate 
framework agreements on services and FDI as well as on 
IPRs (builds on TRIPS).
2000 
 
ANZSCEP (SGP/NZ) Full FTA Comprehensive; ROO: general VA rule (40%); “negative 
list” in services; FDI essentially fully covered; IPR 
included: TRIPS; general commitments on competition; 
only APEC non-binding rules on government procurement
2000  EFTA-SGP Full FTA Comprehensive; complicated product specific ROO; FDI 
essentially fully covered; IPP included: TRIPS; refers to 
WTO Government Procurement Agreement
2002 JSEPA
(J/SGP)
Full FTA Comprehensive; complicated, product specific ROO; 
“negative list” in services; separate financial-services and 
capital market development measures; FDI essentially 
fully covered; IPR included, doesn’t refer to TRIPS; builds 
on WTO Government Procurement
2003 USSFTA
(US/SGP)
Full FTA Highly Comprehensive; 0 year implementation; 
restrictive mainly in textiles and apparel; complicated, 
product specific rules of origin (ROO), including 
“Integrated Sourcing Initiative”; generous “negative 
list” in services; capital controls only as safeguard; 
FDI essentially fully covered; extends WTO TRIPS; 




Full FTA Comprehensive; simple general ROO: 30% or 50% 
local value content; “negative list” in services, no 
safeguard measures except for BoP purposes; FDI 
covered; separate, additional commitments for financial 
services to ensure transparent market access; measures 
on movement of persons included; builds on TRIPS; 













agreed to sign 
FTA in 2006)
Covers trade in goods: positive list to be gradually 
expanded so as to cover at least 80% of the goods on 
tariff lines; IPRs included: protection shall be gradually 
improved in order to be of a level corresponding to the 
standards of multilateral agreements within 8 years
2003 Korea/Chile Full FTA Comprehensive; restrictive in agriculture; complicated 
product specific ROO; “negative list” in services, financial 
services not included; FDI covered; builds on TRIPS; 
Chile not signatory to WTO GPA but government 
procurement covered
.




Full FTA Comprehensive; complicated product specific ROO, 
separate provisions for textiles and apparel; investment 
governed by separate bilateral treaty (2004); IPR refers 
to WTO commitments; 
2004 Japan/Mexico Full FTA Comprehensive; fairly complicated and diverse 
ROO; services and FDI broadly included; IPRs not 
extensively covered, but commitment to multilateral 
agreements; Mexico not signatory to WTO GPA, but 
government procurement is covered
2005 Thailand/Australia Full FTA Comprehensive; complicated product specific ROO; 
special safeguard measures for sensitive agricultural 
goods; services broadly included and full coverage of 
FDI; builds on TRIPS; government procurement not 
covered, but commitment to add as soon as possible 
2005 CECA
(India/SGP)
Full FTA Comprehensive; ROO: generally 40%, but includes 
product-specific rules as well; services and FDI broadly 
covered; “negative list” in services; measures on 
movement of persons included; commitment to develop 
IPR co-operation, no mention of TRIPS; does not cover 




Full FTA Comprehensive; 0 year implementation; complicated 
ROO, product specific rules that apply only to non-
originating materials; “negative list” in services; FDI 
and financial services broadly included, some sector 
specific commitments for financial services; provisions 
on movement of persons; builds on TRIPS; parties 





Full FTA Not fully comprehensive; complicated and product 
specific ROO; “negative list” in services that excludes 
financial services, but Parties commit to commence 
negotiations on financial services chapter in 2 years; FDI 
not covered; builds on TRIPS; parties not signatories 







Limited FTA Not comprehensive; tariff reduction to 20% (non-LDC) or 
30% (LDC) in 2 years and to 0-5% in 5 years; sensitive 
goods are exempt (positive list); generally reserves 
favorable treatment to LDCs 
2005 Korea/EFTA Full FTA No text available yet; comprehensive agreement that 
provides for liberalization of trade in goods, services and 
public procurement and protection of IPRs. Negotiations 







Goal is to double trade and investment between the 




Parties agree to negotiate in order to progressively 
liberalize trade in goods and services and create a liberal 
and transparent investment regime. The implementation 
of measures leading to the Closer Economic partnership 







Parties agree to negotiate in order to establish a Regional 
Trade and Investment Area (RTIA) which includes a FTA 
in goods, services and investment. Negotiations are to 
be finalized by 2005 (FTA and ROO) and 2007 (trade in 
service and investment)
2002 ASEAN/PRC Framework 
Agreement 
for FTA
Parties agree to negotiate in order to establish a full FTA 
by 2012. Newer ASEAN members are allowed a longer 
timeframe (205)
•  As was noted above, the other subregional groupings in Asia—SAARC’s SAPTA, and the ECO’s 
ECOTA—tend to be far less advanced than ASEAN. We include these as “Limited FTAs,” 
but in effect they are just preferential trading arrangements, similar in approach to ASEAN’s 
earliest Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA) of the 1970s. While SAPTA does allow for special 
treatment of its least-developed member-states, coverage is unlikely to stimulate trade. They 
offer relatively limited positive lists and unimpressive margins of preference (as was the case 
with the original ASEAN agreement), though some items are accorded a higher margin of 
preference for least-developed member-states in SAPTA. Rules of origin in these agreements 
tend to be relatively simple, but as the margins of preference are so limited, there apparently 
would be no need even in theory for a more complicated rules-of-origin approach. Enforcement 
mechanisms are weak. Investment is not dealt with in these agreements, though the ECO 
has been working on an investment framework (similar in approach to “Bilateral Investment 
Treaties”). In sum, these agreements could almost as easily have been classified 25
  as “Framework Agreements” as they are merely first steps in what will be a long process.33 They 
are mainly political in nature; as such, they are perhaps paving the way for deeper cooperation 
in the future, as the earlier PTA did. But at present they are superficial at best.
•  With respect to plurilarteral accords, that is, between a region and a country or another region, 
no Full or Limited FTA currently exists, though ASEAN has Framework Agreements toward 
this end with Australia and New Zealand, PRC, India, and Japan. No doubt this reflects the 
difficult nature of negotiating a bilateral accord in the context of an �TA, rather than a �u���m� 
u����. Indeed, the EU, which from its beginning as the EEC, has been able to negotiate myriad 
agreements with countries and even regions with relative ease due to the fact that it has a 
united commercial policy. No such united policy exists in the context of an FTA, and ASEAN 
commercial policies, though relatively liberal compared with other developing countries, tend to 
be highly diverse. Singapore is essentially a free-trade country and one of the most advanced 
economies in the world; the CLMV transitional economies are far less open and sophisticated. 
Still, ASEAN has always had a preference to negotiate with partners as a group, in part out of 
fear that separate trade deals could hurt the process of economic integration within ASEAN 
itself. At first, ASEAN was even against any deepening of integration within the context of APEC 
beyond mere consultation (the “Kuching Consensus”). This is why Singapore’s first bilateral 
FTAs with Japan and the US were so controversial. ASEAN has now accepted the reality of 
the bilateral FTAs that its members are now negotiating, choosing to avoid any diminishing of 
the ASEAN integration process by pushing forward under the AEC and in other cooperative 
areas. Th�� �� ��e ex�mp�e �f h�w reg�������m ��� ���u���y f���er gre��er ���egr����� ��d 
��ber���z�����  �hr�ugh  �  pr��e��  �f  re��f�r�eme��  ��d  ��mpe������  (discussed  in  the  next 
section). Nevertheless, ASEAN does appreciate the potential benefits of developing plurilateral 
accords wherever possible, commensurately with bilateral accords. For example, soon after 
the ASEAN-China Framework agreement in December 2001, Japan decided to begin its own 
negotiation process with ASEAN, culminating in the 2003 Framework Agreement. It is doing 
this while at the same time negotiating FTAs and bilateral trade agreements with individual 
ASEAN countries. On the other hand, through its “Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative,” the US has 
implicitly demonstrated that it is not interested in an agreement with ASEAN but rather with its 
component members.34  
With  respect  to  the  Framework Agreements  themselves, ASEAN  and Australia  and  New 
Zealand (through their “Closer Economic Partnership,” or CEP, which is an advanced FTA) 
finally followed up on its Framework Agreement intentions in March 2005 with negotiations 
toward the creation of an FTA. ASEAN and CEP ministers completed their 10th consultations 
in September 2005. The PRC has moved much more quickly; after its “early harvest” program 
with ASEAN in January 2004, it finalized a deal on trade in goods and a blueprint for FTA 
negotiations by the end of that year. The agreement on trade in goods began implementation 
in July 2005 and PRC and ASEAN are currently working on services and investment; the fourth 
consultations between PRC and ASEAN senior officials began in September 2005.3� Still, it is 
important not to exaggerate how much the trade and goods agreement itself covers; to date, 
tariff lines enjoying zero tariffs only constitute 4.8% of the total.36 The services agreement is 
expected to be signed at the 11th ASEAN Summit in Malaysia in December.37 The ASEAN-India 
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33 We label them as “Limited FTAs” only because they are written up as actual accords, rather than a framework for 
future negotiations..
34 There are a number of reasons for this, including the diversity of ASEAN, the difficulty of dealing with transitional 




Framework Agreement stipulates that the first phase of negotiations on an FTA (and the rules 
of origin) should be complete by the end of 2005, leaving the agreement on services and 
investment for 2007.
 
•  Bilateral accords with key nonregional OECD members, in particular Australia, EU, Japan, 
and US are in many ways quite similar. These tend to be “Full FTAs” with extensive product 
coverage for goods and services, especially for the agreements involving Singapore (Singapore 
has FTAs with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and US),38 and include the many areas cited 
above under Full FTAs. In fact, the US has said explicitly that it would like the US-Singapore 
FTA to be a “model” for bilateral FTAs with all qualifying ASEAN countries,39 and at the time 
of writing it had recently finished its fifth round of bilateral negotiations with Thailand. The 
US and Japan are both signatories to the WTO Government Procurement Protocol, and their 
bilateral FTAs tend to build on these, even with partners that are not signatories. Australia 
is not a signatory to the WTO Government Procurement protocol but it does tend to include 
government procurement in its arrangements. New Zealand explicitly includes the APEC Non-
binding Principles on Government Procurement in its FTA with Singapore (ANZSCEP).
All OECD partners include IPR chapters that extend and/or reinforce WTO TRIPs, and investment 
provisions tend to be fully covered. Indeed, in these agreements the WTO “Singapore Issues,” 
which it was said “doomed” the WTO Cancun Ministerial, are addressed essentially in full. 
The agreements with the US tend to be the deepest and include such sensitive sectors as 
financial services, capital controls, and competition policy, including competition by state-owned 
enterprises. 
It would appear that many of these US accords are not only “modern” in the sense that we’ve 
used in this paper but also are being emulated by other developed countries in their respective 
bilateral FTAs. Hence, in many ways, they are becoming a blueprint or at least a benchmark 
for  the  other  accords.  Interestingly,  the  smaller  developed  countries  are  negotiating  their 
agreements keeping in mind that larger developed countries, such as the US, will also be 
negotiating deep agreements with Asian developing countries. Hence, in anticipation of this 
they are including certain MFN-like clauses, which would give them maximum access if and 
when future accords are made. For example, let’s assume that Australia is negotiating an FTA 
with Thailand, and it would like to include liberal coverage of the financial services sector. This 
sector is highly sensitive in Thailand, and Australia knows that it would be extremely difficult 
to include it, as it does not have the negotiating clout (or the political opportunity cost would 
be too high). Hence, rather than squander resources in such a difficult and uncertain area, 
it would seek an MFN clause, knowing that the US will insist on maximum coverage of this 
area and, once a US-Thailand agreement is complete, Australia would naturally gain access. 
Indeed, the US has been trying to include a comprehensive treatment of financial services in 
its negotiations with Thailand, based on a “negative list” approach, but thus far it has not made 
any progress (The N�����, September 27, 2005). 
Interestingly, this sort of approach was known as “unconditional MFN” of pre-GATT trade accords, 
when trade agreements were basically bilateral. The GATT was intended to multilateralize 
“unconditional MFN,” as is clear in Article I of the GATT/WTO.
 
38 EFTA also has an FTA with Singapore, but the EU does not. However, the EU did launch the Trans-regional EU-
ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI) talks in April 2003 to improve economic relations between the EU and ASEAN 
regions. Its practical emphasis was on health and hygiene standards and the protection of intellectual property rights, 
with trade barriers and other issues left to be handled at the Doha Development Agenda talks. As is discussed below, 
in April 2005, the EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, and the ASEAN Trade Ministers agreed to set up a “Vi-
sion Group” to consider such new cooperative initiatives, including a possible EU-ASEAN Free-trade Area. 
39 There are two conditions: (i) the ASEAN member state must be a member of the WTO; and (ii) it must have a 
Trade and Investment Facilitation and Liberalization (TIFL) accord in place, meaning it must have normal trade rela-
tions with the US.27
•  Japan’s first FTA was its agreement with Singapore in 2002. The agreement is comprehensive, 
but somewhat less so than the US-Singapore agreement. Since then, it has reached FTA 
accords  several  ASEAN  countries,  including  Thailand  (August  2005).  Details  are  either 
unavailable at present regarding these agreements or are still being worked out,40 such as 
in the case of Japan-Thailand. This FTA was slated to be signed in April 2006 with a goal of 
implementation 5 months later. It would appear, however, that while there will be substantial 
coverage of the auto sector (an area which proved to be extremely difficult in the negotiations) 
included agricultural goods will be fairly limited (for example, rice and sugar are excluded). 
Rules of origin considerations still need to be worked out.
•  The EU has not yet negotiated an FTA with any Asian country. It may appear odd that this 
economic grouping, which more than any other has led the regionalism movement and has 
often served as a model for ASEAN and others, has not joined other OECD countries in forming 
FTAs in the region. As Asia is the most dynamic region in the world, such neglect obviously 
comes with considerable risk. In part, this neglect is due to the fact that the EU’s attention has 
been focused elsewhere: in May 2004, it enlarged to include 10 additional Central and Eastern 
European members; it has been preoccupied with the EU Constitution and associated referenda, 
which eventually ended in failure (for the time being); it has been focusing on internal growth 
problems and debates surrounding its commitment to become the most competitive knowledge-
based economy in the world by 2010 (the “Lisbon Agenda”); and its primary trade initiatives 
in Asia have focused on dealing with the PRC in the wake of the expiry of the Agreement on 
Textiles and Apparel in January 2005. However, the EU has always kept a close watch on these 
trends in Asia. Its response to APEC was to create ASEM, but it has done little with ASEM (as 
APEC itself has done little in terms of deeds) outside of basic consultations and studies as 
to how to improve bilateral relations. Moreover, the EU is now rising to the challenge: In April 
2005, the EU and ASEAN trade ministers agreed to set up a “Vision Group” to consider such 
new cooperative initiatives, including a possible EU-ASEAN Free-trade Area. 
•  We do not include APEC in the table, as it is not only a mere Framework Agreement with 
ambiguous goals but also includes a wide variety of members outside Asia. Still, it is worth 
mentioning, as just about all East Asian countries are members of APEC. The most salient 
economic initiative within APEC is the “Bogor Vision,” which dedicates the region to “open trade 
and investment” by 2010 (2020 for developing countries). APEC has always embraced “open 
regionalism,” but it has never been clear exactly what is meant by this term. As noted in Section 
I, there are two competing schools of thought: one would argue that any concerted regional 
liberalization should be nondiscriminatory (i.e., non-member countries should automatically 
benefit from trade and investment liberalization), while another would suggest that it would be 
non-discriminatory in that all APEC accords would be open to non-members pr�v�ded that they 
reciprocate. It is also unclear as to what “open trade and investment” means. 
Achieving the Bogor Vision, however defined, was always going to be an extremely difficult 
process, and the ambiguities surrounding it only complicate the process, as does its “voluntary” 
nature.  While  a  nondiscrminatory  accord  would  be  applauded  by  economists,  political 
scientists marvel at its political naiveté. On the other hand, a reciprocal accord, which might 
be supported by those in the pro-regionalism camp, would create the possibility of a split in 
the global marketplace, given the fact that APEC is so large. In the meantime, as noted above, 
the process itself has ebbed. Nevertheless, APEC does play a role in trade and investment 
facilitation in the region by providing a forum for discussions, urging trade and investment 
liberalization, and developing region-wide practical ways of reducing transactions costs. For 
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40 Bilateral trade agreements have been worked out with Malaysia and the Philippines.28
example, extensive work is being undertaken by APEC working groups on improving customs 
clearance  procedures,  including  the  creation  of  a  businessperson’s  “smart  card,”  APEC 
investment agreements, exploration of means to facilitate technology transfer, cooperation in 
infrastructure, standards and conformance, harmonization of product standards, enhanced 
dialogue on trade and investment facilitation and development cooperation (ECOTECH), and 
means toward improving other areas generally classified under “deep integration.”4
Following the Asian financial crisis, APEC was compelled to deal with financial issues. APEC 
cooperation was not initially intended to include finance as a principal area of cooperation; the 
emphasis has been on facilitating and liberalizing trade and FDI, as well as ancillary “nuts-and-
bolts” issues that are useful for improving business interaction and lowering transactions costs 
in the region. Because of the 1997/98 crisis, APEC officials now agree that the region should 
be actively involved in supporting regional financial stability, but there does not yet seem to be 
a consensus on what should be done. Moreover, the work that has been done within APEC 
regarding financial stability concerns is not well known and, hence, APEC has thus far had little 
effect to date in promoting financial cooperation (Feinberg and Ye Zhao 2001).
In sum, Asia has been successful in negotiating a number of bilateral and regional FTAs, and has 
plans for several plurilateral agreements. This process is very recent; outside of AFTA (1992), the 
first bilateral FTA in the region, between Singapore and New Zealand, was signed only in 2000. If 
one includes all of the proposed agreements at various levels of discussion and negotiation, as well 
as the others that will emerge in response to these, it is easy to forecast a complicated web of formal 
relationships, of various degrees of depth, binding the region together. It is not difficult to understand 
and appreciate the anti-regionalism camp’s concern that such a “spaghetti bowl” of regional accords 
could be potentially damaging to the global trading system. The EU has had to live with such a system 
for decades, and it has created considerable complications in certain areas (Messerlin 2001).42 We 
now tackle this debate in some detail.  
III. Turning Stumbling Blocs into Building Blocs: How to Minimize Spaghetti-bowl 
Effects
The “spaghetti bowl” effect refers to the Italian pasta dish famous for being highly intertwined. The term 
is used generally in a derogatory manner by critics of regionalism to underscore problems in terms of 
coverage diversity, overlap, and “contradictions” associated with an economy having many different 
preferential trading agreements. As was noted above, this is potentially a real problem in the global 
marketplace. A strong advantage of MFN in the WTO framework is that it generally (but not totally) 
avoids this problem.
Exactly how big is this problem, and how might countries minimize the associated effects? We address 
these issues in this section, beginning with a conceptual/analytical approach to the problem. This is 
followed by a brief review of the debate regarding whether or not policy reform within the context of a 
regional trading arrangement can actually support global trade and investment liberalization, meaning 
regional trading accords are “building blocs,” or whether they detract from it —they are “stumbling 
blocs.” Finally, we develop a framework that might be used to minimize the negative implications 
of preferential trading arrangements in general and “spaghetti bowl” effects in particular. Given that 
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42 For example, bilateral agreements with Mediterranean countries eventually led to the new to create a plurilateral 
“Global Mediterranean Policy.” A variety of influences has led the EU to abandon its Lomé Agreements in favor of the 
Contonou Agreements, which essentially creates a series of FTAs with former colonies (ACP countries). Presently 
over 80% of EU total trade takes place under its “pyramid of preferences,” rather than WTO-MFN.29
regionalism in Asia is gaining momentum and will likely continue to do so for some time, such guidelines 
are important to keep the agreements efficient, open, and supportive of global trade and investment. 
a. Introductory Comments Regarding Regionalism versus Multilateralism
It is important to note first of all that, while WTO accords do impose a certain symmetry, they do 
not guarantee it. For example, the WTO sets out rules of behavior in terms of anti-dumping that are 
no doubt superior to a system void of rules. But they do not harmonize all anti-dumping practices. 
Member-states continue to have a great deal of flexibility in this regard (and probably always will 
have, at least in the context of the WTO). The existence of a WTO Valuation Agreement on customs is 
extremely useful, but there continues to be considerable variation in terms of adopted practices across 
WTO member-states. The same can generally be true of the Singapore Issues, IPR protection, and 
the like, in which the WTO often has little or incomplete jurisdiction (and likely will not have much more 
for the foreseeable future).43 A salient disadvantage of the multilateral approach under the WTO is 
that harmonization of such rules and policies has proven to be extremely difficult, and progress highly 
limited—due to the diversity of its membership as well as disagreements as to how comprehensive the 
mission of the WTO should be. 
The usefulness of regional agreements—and certainly one reason for their popularity (see World Bank 
2005, ADB 2002, Kreinin and Plummer 2002, Frankel 1998)—lies in their ability to drive integration 
and cooperation in areas that have hitherto been neglected by the WTO, such as in tariff, nontariff, and 
non-border measures. Thus, while it is true that a multilateral approach would dominate a bilateral/
regional strategy if all the same measures are included and harmonized/liberalized to the same extent, 
it is not a dominant strategy once we relax this (unrealistic) assumption of symmetry in liberalization. 
In fact, when critics of regionalism demonstrate the inferiority of preferential treatment relative to free 
trade, frequently the analysis falls into “straw man” analysis. For example, the rules of origin constraints 
under NAFTA, discussed below, in automobiles (62.5%) and certain textile products (effectively 100%) 
do not fit the criteria for “open regionalism” under any definition of this term. However, these are probably 
among the most obvious out of relatively few such divergences in what is in reality a liberal agreement. 
Besides, for NAFTA, the effective benchmark should be the ����u� qu�, not free �r�de. Would auto 
and textile imports to the US have been much less restrictive without NAFTA? Not necessarily. In fact, 
admitting that associated trade diversion does have costs, we cannot say that NAFTA closed those 
markets, since failure to meet NAFTA rules of origin meant recourse to the ����u� qu�. The ����u� qu� 
did not become more protective; in textiles and apparel, the US market has become m�re open with 
the expiration of global import quotas on 1 January 2005 (under Uruguay Round commitments). Again, 
Mexican textiles receive preferential treatment and, hence, trade diversion is a cost to be borne by 
non-partners and US consumers, but there still is an associated trade creation effect that would have 
not occurred had there been no NAFTA. 
Many American economists supported NAFTA not for love of regionalism or their belief that it would have 
great effects on allocative efficiency in North America through the liberalization of tariff and nontariff 
barriers, which after all, were low in the aggregate.44  Effects on the US and, especially, Canada, were 
estimated to be small. Rather, it was supported in the main because it would lock in the Mexican 
economic reforms leading up to NAFTA and would set the stage for further liberalization. Given the 
history of economic volatility in Mexico, NAFTA as a “policy anchor” was deemed to be extremely 
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useful. Once NAFTA began to be implemented in full force—after the Mexican crisis in December 1994, 
which had little or nothing to do with NAFTA directly—the net effect on macro performance in Mexico 
has been very positive (Kose and Rebucci 2005). In 2005, the US government gave a high priority to 
an FTA with Central America (“CAFTA”) in hopes that it would have the same stabilizing effect.45 And 
while the percentage of total Mexican trade has risen to somewhat over three-fourths (from two-thirds) 
in the wake of NAFTA, a result of both trade creation and diversion, one cannot say that Mexico has 
been “captive” in NAFTA. In fact, Mexico now has negotiated some 39 FTAs. Moreover, openness of 
the Mexican economy has allowed non-partner countries to benefit; the financial sector in Mexico, for 
example, is characterized by a considerable European presence. 
Again, this is not to argue that restrictive rules of origin and other inward-looking clauses in regional 
trading arrangements do not constitute a problematic aspect of preferential trading arrangements. As is 
argued below, a consistent, liberal, across-the-board rules-of-origin policy carries the least distortion in 
a second-best world. But we should not exaggerate its absolute importance in the regionalism debate. 
Moreover, it is inconsistent to focus merely on the problem of discrimination across ��u��r�e�, which is 
the key problem in an FTA, to the complete exclusion of the problems associated with discrimination 
across �e���r�, which results from piecemeal multilateral liberalization.46 
A related point was underscored analytically in Wonnecott and Wonnecott (1981) in terms of tariff 
liberalization. Early advocates of a purely nondiscriminatory approach to tariff liberalization (in the 
tradition of Cooper and Massell 1965 and Berglas 1979) maintained that such a strategy was always 
superior to a regional approach. Every country has within its own powers the ability to unilaterally 
liberalize its commercial policy regime, and if this is done on a nondiscriminatory basis, there will be 
only trade creation and no trade diversion. Hence, unilateral trade liberalization “dominates” FTAs 
and customs unions, as the latter generate trade diversion as well as trade creation. Wonnecott 
and Wonnecott (1981) pointed out that these “unilateralists” missed the obvious point that countries 
engage in regional trade negotiations in order to open up their partner(s)’s market, rather than merely 
to extract gains through greater domestic liberalization. Thus, while trade diversion is eliminated under 
a nondiscriminatory approach, the fact that foreign markets are left untouched without negotiation 
would suggest that the welfare gains would be limited. Indeed, an FTA could be superior to unilateral 
liberalization if the gains in terms of increased national welfare due to foreign reductions in tariff barriers 
(for example, through gains to domestic exporters and improvements in terms of trade) were greater 
than the losses due to trade diversion.
Moreover, time ��d depth matter. Many protagonists of a purely multilateral approach to economic 
cooperation tend to present arguments without a well-defined time horizon. But time is important when 
considering the present discounted value to national welfare of a regional trading accord compared with 
multilateral free trade. A heuristic example may help underscore this point. Suppose, say, Indonesia, 
has an option to create an FTA with Japan, but its leaders know that this will have some costs in terms 
of trade diversion. The “first-best” (global free trade) policy, its leaders might reckon, would ultimately 
be the best deal for Indonesia, as nondiscriminatory free trade would have no trade diversion and 
could maximize trade creation. But timing would be crucial as to whether or not Indonesia should 
agree to the accord from an economic perspective. Suppose that global free trade were an option 
immediately. �e�er�� p�r�bu�, free trade would be better than the deal with Japan. But what if the FTA 
with Japan were possible today, and yet global free trade would take 5 more years? Which would be 
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better? It would depend on what the Indonesia-Japan deal would look like (relative to the global deal); 
nevertheless, it could be that free trade would still be worth the wait. But what if free trade were to 
take more like 20, 30, or 40 years? After all, the GATT/WTO has existed for almost a half-century, and 
global free trade is nowhere in sight. Of course, this type of analysis will be a function of the type of 
regional accord, in particular if it is inward-looking or outward-looking. If it were the former, the deal 
with Japan could end up being very much to the detriment of Indonesia. As we shall see in terms of 
the “building bloc versus stumbling bloc” debate, the type of agreement is of the essence. But it would 
also be important to know what the multilateral deal would be. If a regional accord entailed far more 
reforms vis-à-vis market-friendly, efficient policies at macro and micro levels whereas global free trade 
meant merely the abolition of tariff and nontariff barriers, the former could still potentially be as good 
as or better than the latter.
Indeed, the point expressed above in terms of the Wonnecott and Wonnecott framework is even more 
important when applied to modern FTAs, which include nontariff and non-border policies that the 
WTO does not yet touch (and may never, in some cases), and for which a unilateral approach would 
have limited benefits. The extensive tariff liberalization over the past two decades in East Asia, and 
more recently in parts of South Asia, would suggest that countries have ���re����g�y �e�� incentive to 
engage in the WTO should it continue to focus on tariffs and mostly on manufactured products and 
limited agricultural goods. While progress was made at the Uruguay Round, further integration of the 
international marketplace will be more difficult at the margin, for the remaining areas that now have 
the greatest potential for improving international interchange tend to be the most delicate, in terms 
of their traditional political sensitivity (for example, various agricultural products and areas in which a 
country has comparative disadvantage), national-sovereignty questions (such as those with respect to 
IPR, labor, and environmental protection), and the power over domestic regulation (like the Singapore 
issues). Progress in these areas at the WTO has always proven to be exceedingly difficult, and they 
continue to be so today. The Seattle Ministerial; Cancun Ministerial; and Hong Kong, China WTO 
Ministerial in December 2005 testify to this.
Herein lies the attraction and, in many ways, advantage that regionalism holds over multilateralism: it 
allows like-minded countries to address far more issues and in a shorter period of time. By choosing one 
or several like-minded partners, countries are able to make more progress in terms of deep integration 
than they could in the extremely-diverse WTO context. Recent interest in regionalism on the part 
of OECD countries that have traditionally shunned them (Australia and New Zealand, Japan, South 
Korea, US,, and so on) derives from their desire to address these many issues and their understanding 
that they cannot accomplish them in the context of the WTO, or at least not in the short/medium 
run. A successful conclusion to Doha would, perhaps, have an impact on the momentum behind the 
regionalism movement, but this is not guaranteed: the incentives for new bilateral/plurilateral accords, 
as well as for deepening existing ones, would remain. 
But what is guaranteed through a successful Doha Development Agenda is a reduction in the potential 
negative effects of these regional agreements and overall less risk to the integrity of the international 
trading system. Moreover, to the extent that Doha can, indeed, make Article XXIV more effective in 
ensuring that these new regional agreements will be outward-looking and consistent with a WTO 
approach, the risks associated with regionalism could be significantly mitigated. 
Such important steps forward would be cheered by all pro-globalization economists, regardless of 
whether they are in the pro- or anti-regionalism camp. Nevertheless, the challenges are great, perhaps 
overwhelming, at least for Doha. Success, assuming it arrives in the current WTO negotiations, would 
be defined at a much more modest level. In the meantime, it is a good working assumption that the 
current regionalism trend will continue—indeed, intensify—in the short- and medium run. 
Hence, the obvious question emerges as to how regional agreements themselves can work in favor 
of global free trade. We approach this question from two perspectives. First, there is the more “macro 32
policy” perspective relative to the “building blocs versus stumbling blocs” debate. Next, we look at the 
nuts and bolts of regional agreements and ask how their very components can be made to minimize 
any associated policy distortions, and how they may be harmonized in order to avoid the “spaghetti-
bowl” effect discussed above. In other words, we ask the question: given that regionalism is a second-
best policy, to what degree and how can it be made to resemble the first-best as much as possible?   
Kemp and Wan (1976) were the first to show that a customs union could be made Pareto Optimal (first 
best) focusing on tariff adjustments.47 We will try to revisit this approach in the broader context of policy 
formation in terms of non-border issues.  
b. Building Blocs versus Stumbling Blocs: Theoretical Considerations
Does regionalism support unilateral/multilateral reform goals, or does the discrimination inherent in 
a trade bloc lead to a “second best” outcome at best, or an inward-looking one at worst? This is the 
essence of the “building blocs” versus “stumbling blocs” debate. The literature would suggest that 
several possible negative policy consequences could emerge from an FTA—inherent “stumbling bloc” 
tendencies—while either tendencies would be consistent with multilateral goals and market-friendly 
domestic liberalization. Briefly, these would include the following:48: 
i. Stumbling blocs:
•  Maximizing  terms  of  trade.  Regional  integration,  particularly  customs  unions,  increases 
the size of an economic zone and, as such, increases market power. The potential benefits 
of exploiting such an advantage by imposing an “optimal tariff”—maximizing the difference 
between the terms of trade gains from a tariff regime against its costs in terms of efficiency—
are familiar from the international trade literature. Moreover, FTAs and customs unions, by 
“virtue” of the trade diversion effect, improve their terms of trade relative to the rest of the world; 
the larger the grouping, the larger the potential improvement in the terms of trade. 
In reality, the first effect is probably not particularly relevant, as even in tariff regimes in the 
context of a customs union are not erected according to optimum tariff rules.49 Moreover, in 
the cases of both customs unions and FTAs, changes in the external tariff regime cannot on 
average be more protective than the pre-integration ����u� qu�, according to Article XXIV. This 
does not mean that there will not be any potentially negative sector effects, but in this case 
GATT/WTO members are able to sue for compensation. The most famous case in this regard is 
the “Turkey: Restrictions on Imports of Textile Products,” in which India initiated a GATT panel 
against Turkey in the wake of the harmonization of its external tariff with the EU when it formed 
a customs union in manufactures (Herzstein and Whitlock 2005).50  Of course, this effect would 
be even less important with improved rules within the context of Article XXIV. 
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With respect to the terms of trade effect, since trade diversion undeniably results from preferential 
trading arrangements, it is certainly a concern. But trade diversion is actually a one-time price 
effect and, hence, static in nature. In fact, it is �he static cost of preferential trading accords. 
•  Manipulation of the contents and scope of the agreement by special interests. This 
concern obviously also manifests itself in the context of domestic policy formation. Deardorff 
(2004) stresses that this is especially a problem in the context of developed-developing country 
accords, in which the former obviously have the upper hand, as special interests tend to be 
far better organized and funded. The lack of rigor and coverage in Article XXIV makes this 
a particular problem, as the flexibility allowed in an FTA tends to give considerable liberty to 
special-interest influences. Of course, this could also have a positive effect: special interest 
groups in developed countries no doubt push for better IPR protection, competition policy, 
treatment of FDI, and better trade and investment facilitation, but these could have important 
positive effects on efficiency and policy formation in developing countries. 
•  Waste  of  scarce  negotiating  resources.  Particularly  (but  not  exclusively)  in  the  case 
of developing countries, the scarcity of well-trained and well-experienced experts on trade 
negotiations imply that the opportunity cost of resources devoted to regional agreements is the 
allocation of less talent to multilateral deals. Critics of regionalism suggest that such a capacity 
constraint  can  only  be  detrimental  to  multilateral  liberalization,  and  even  well-developed 
domestic policy reform. For example, after Viet Nam joined ASEAN in 1995, it worked not 
only to enter into AFTA (due for completion in 2006) but also to implement a number of other 
accords, including an extensive Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) with the US in 2001. On top of 
that, it was working on APT initiatives and, eventually, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). 
Given its human-capital capacity constraints, this could very well have delayed its drive to join 
the WTO. In the worst-case scenario, as articulated in the colorful words of Peter Drysdale, 
regionalism can “suck oxygen” out of the reform movement.5
Or perhaps not. A counter-argument would be that Viet Nam has been able to ready its economy 
for the WTO through the outward-oriented policies of ASEAN, and the BTA itself is essentially 
a means of preparing Viet Nam for WTO entry, including legal and administrative reforms that 
would in any event be necessary (Lao PDR and the US began to implement this year the same 
type of BTA with the same goals). The agreement is replete with reference to WTO protocols 
and WTO-consistent reforms, from services liberalization to TRIPs-Plus. These negotiations 
have also sharpened the expertise of Viet Nam’s negotiating authorities. The US also allocated 
a relatively large project (the “STAR Project”) to assist Viet Nam in reforming its legal system to 
be more compatible with international norms, as well as train officials
ii. Building Blocs. 
•  Lock in policy change. We have referred to this effect fairly frequently in previous sections, 
using in particular the case of Mexico in NAFTA. But there are many others, including the case 
of Viet Nam mentioned above, which has been able to use regional integration as a blueprint for 
market-friendly reform to become more competitive in the international marketplace. Without 
ASEAN (and eventually the BTA), one can easily argue that Viet Nam would have not made 
as much progress (and its joining the WTO would no doubt have been further delayed, instead 
of probable accession in the near future). This effect also applies to industrialized regions: as 
was noted in Section Ib, when Greece (1981), and Spain and Portugal (1986), joined the EU, 
they were essentially “newly-industrialized economies”, each having had political instability/
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transition only a few years before. They each made significant strides in modernizing their 
policies and economies—as a result of EU accession—and today have significantly closed 
the gap with advanced industrial economies, featuring a relatively-standardized set of modern 
economic policies. 
•  Improve negotiating power for smaller units. Traditionally, the possibility of small countries 
joining together and working as one cohesive unit in trade negotiations has always been 
recognized: even Harry Johnson, who was an avid critic of regionalism, acknowledged this 
potential benefit. This would apply both to smaller countries as well as larger units, such as the 
EU (discussed below). Hence, in theory, ASEAN should be able to have much more power in 
influencing WTO negotiations, or bilateral/regional/plurilateral deals in general, as a group: the 
whole could be greater than the sum of its parts.
The EU has certainly been effective in this regard from its beginning as the European Economic 
Community. But it began as a customs union, not merely an FTA, in which national commercial 
policy vis-à-vis third countries can differ (oft-times, substantially). ASEAN, for example, has 
never been very effective in projecting its power as a unified group, even after AFTA. The region 
is just too diverse and the interests of individual countries diverge too much. Most resource-rich 
ASEAN countries were part of the Cairns group at the Uruguay Round, but they essentially 
acted more as individual member-states rather than as a group. Joint action in APEC and 
even in the context of APT, though existent, has been widely considered disappointing. Thus, 
we could probably conclude that this potential “building bloc” is theoretically a possibility, but 
in practice can be somewhat difficult, being a function of the type of accord (FTA or customs 
union) and the interests of the component states. Size within the group also matters; Brazil, for 
example, has been effective in using MERCOSUR, a customs union comprised of Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, in international negotiations, such as the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA). But rather than acting as group, Brazil was essentially able to use the region 
to project its own approach to the FTAA, which has resulted in no progress at all. This was 
not necessarily in the interest of other MERCOSUR countries, particularly the small ones, as 
suggested by the fact that many Latin American countries are now negotiating bilateral/regional 
FTAs directly with the US.
•  A Dynamic weeding process as a first step toward free trade. It could very well be that the 
process of structural adjustment unleashed by a regional trading arrangement through trade 
creation could, in effect, make multilateral accords easier. As the weakest (and, hence, more 
resistant to any international competition) are weeded out due to, say, an FTA, the stock of 
opposition to trade falls in importance, thereby making multilateral initiatives easier. 
Perhaps an example would illustrate the point. Suppose that the trade policies of a country 
(let’s call  it “home”)  are determined  by domestic  firms, and  “home”  trades  with two other 
countries: “partner” (the country that would ultimately form an FTA with “home”) and “rest of 
world.” Furthermore, assume that, in autarky, there are six industries, with linear cost structures 
of the firms in the home country being such that two are globally competitive (goods A and B), 
two (goods C and D) are competitive only regionally (in a potential FTA with “partner”), and 
two would never be competitive with trade (goods E and F). Now, assume that the “home” 
government puts to vote whether or not the country should move to free trade. Firms producing 
A and B will vote yes, as they would benefit from a larger market, but the other four firms would 
vote against it, as they would be put out of business. We remain in an autarkic equilibrium. 
But suppose now that the home country votes on whether or not it should have an FTA with 
“partner”. Goods A, B, C, and D will vote in favor, and E and F against. The FTA would pass. 
Eventually, competition from the partner country will force out production of goods E and F in 
the home country (trade creation), and there will be no trade diversion (as we began in autarky). 
The remaining firms in the home country will, therefore, eventually only produce A, B, C, and 35
D. Next, assume that the home country votes once again on whether or not it should have free 
trade. The votes will now be two in favor (A and B) and two against (C and D); assuming that 
consumers have even a little say would be sufficient to usher in free trade, and this would be 
due to the FTA “stepping stone” process.
 
•  Competitive liberalization to attract international capital, as well as a positive “threat.”   
Regional integration can be used as a means of rendering the component economies more 
efficient, competitive, and market friendly. While a grouping may or may not adopt global “best 
practices” in regulatory, legal, and other issues, it can reduce the stock of divergences across 
countries (thereby making it easier to integrate globally). By reducing transactions costs across 
countries,  an  FTA  can  enhance  its  attractiveness  to  multinationals. As  policy  externalities 
become increasingly important as an FTA “deepens,” the incentive to internalize them through 
monitoring, sharing information, closer cooperation, increases. Because trade and financial 
links are becoming increasingly appreciated, countries within an FTA soon find it useful—or 
even necessary—to further financial and macroeconomic cooperation.
It may also be true that regional agreements can be used as implicit and explicit “threats,” 
particularly since FTAs seem to have a tendency to grow over time. An obvious example was 
the boost that President Bill Clinton gave to APEC in 1993, when it invited leaders to Blake 
Island, Washington, for the first APEC Heads of State Summit. Strengthening the organization 
was supported at Blake Island, and the political will to move forward on economic cooperation, 
especially in trade, was obviously in evidence (the next year in Indonesia this would manifest 
itself in the “Bogor Vision” goals of open trade and investment). Now, prior to Blake Island, 
the Uruguay Round had failed to be approved twice (in 2000 and again in 2002) essentially 
because the EU and the US, backed by the Cairns Group, could not reach an agreement 
on agriculture. After the Blake Island Summit, the Europeans decided to sign the agreement, 
which was also ultimately ratified in the US (but only with strong support by Clinton). Many 
experts have stressed that Clinton deliberately used APEC as a “threat” to Europe—if the 
Uruguay Round didn’t go through, the US was perfectly willing to move forward on free trade 
with Asia. Rather than face trade diversion in the world’s most rapidly growing market by far, 
the EU opted for the GATT. 
Each of these arguments has �he�re����� merits. But in practice, the inclination of the regional accord 
tends to be extremely important. Clearly, if the group is being formed as a means of enhancing inward-
looking development strategies or as a way of isolating the region from global competition, this initial 
policy thrust would set in motion many of the problems discussed above. In fact, this approach led 
to the downfall of many regional trading agreements in the past, especially in Latin American (for 
example, the Latin American Free Trade Area). Yet, if outward-looking economies form a regional 
grouping, it is likely that regionalism will serve to promote the goals of domestic policy reform and 
multilateral liberalization. This is due to at least four factors: (i) it is unlikely that a country wishing to 
promote outward-looking policies, including extensive unilateral liberalization and active participation 
at the WTO, would contradict this stance in favor of a regionally-closed system; (ii) reductions in 
trade  barriers  within  a  preferential  trading  arrangement  make  it  more  attractive  for  a  country  to 
reduce external barriers, in effect “MFN-izing” regional concessions, because the most important cost 
of regionalism is trade diversion and lower external barriers will reduce associated costs; (iii) the 
“weeding out” of least competitive industries discussed above, and making the political economy of 
trade liberalization more favorable over time, seems to have been important empirically,52 and (iv) the 
membership of preferential trading arrangements tends to expand and to become more diverse over time, 
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thereby reducing regional sources of support for protectionism in a particular country and industry, as well 
as reducing the overall potential for trade diversion. One might add to this the list of nontraditional benefits 
for developing countries in regional trading agreements noted in Section I—macroeconomic stability, FDI 
and technology transfer, structural policy change and reform, state-of-the-art harmonization, political and 
political economy aspects of regionalism. 
In sum, while the risk of regionalism is real and, as with any real-world second-best policies, costs exist, it 
would appear that what is driving the regionalism movement in the 2000s is based on an outward-looking 
approach to integration. AFTA and other expressions of ASEAN integration are exemplary of this aproach. 
Still, minimizing costs is of the essence. Below, we attempt to develop a blueprint as to how countries 
might minimize costs (and maximize benefits).  
c. A Taxonomy of Relevant Policies and Approaching First-Best
The desirability of preferential trading agreements in general and “stumbling bloc versus building bloc” 
considerations in particular constitute the most divisive debate among mainstream international trade 
economists. But while there is no consensus, essentially all would agree that the relationship between 
regionalism and overall policy reform is of the essence. To the extent that regionalism is open and 
supports a market-friendly economic reform process, it would be welcomed by all. The debate outlined 
above centers around this question.
Even though a great deal has been written on this and related issues, little has been done focusing on 
specific components of regional trade groupings themselves and how they influence the debate. True, 
there are many anecdotes, with rules of origin being a favorite example as to how FTAs embody a good 
deal of hidden protectionism. However, we have argued that focusing on such anecdotes may not be 
productive; what matters is the entire picture and how it compares to the ����u� qu�. In this subsection, 
we endeavor to highlight some of these component policies and suggest how they might be developed 
in order to minimize distortions and favor an outward-oriented approach—in other words, how the 
“�p�ghe���-b�w� effect” might be minimized and turned into a “����g�� effect”.53 
APEC and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) have also taken up the issue of best 
practices in FTAs, and they have articulated key general principles and guidelines that the Asia-Pacific 
region needs to embrace in order to reduce business-related transactions costs.54 They stress that 
FTAs should embrace nondiscrimination (presumably where possible, as FTAs by their very nature 
are discriminatory), comprehensiveness, flexibility, WTO-consistency, transparency, and cooperation. 
However, as noted by Scollay (2004), the language of related statements does not go far beyond that 
of the relevant clauses in the 1994 WTO Understanding on Interpretation of GATT Article XXIV.  
In its Trade Facilitation Action Plan (October 2002), subsequently formalized in the 2003 “Shanghai 
Declaration,” APEC leaders dedicated themselves to a 5% reduction in transactions costs due to red 
tape and other costly barriers to doing business by 2006 through trade facilitation measures. The 
Action Plan articulates over 50 reforms to be undertaken in the general areas of movement of goods 
(including expediting customs clearance), standards (such as harmonization of procedures and rules 
in goods and services trade), business mobility, and e-commerce.55 In June 2006, the APEC Ministers 
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52 Perhaps it would be more accurate to say “anecdotally,” as the empirical literature on this subject is not well devel-
oped. Given its importance, we suggest in the last section that this should be an important area of future research.
53 While both belong to the Italian food group known as “pasta,” lasagna is made using a straight, wide, and flat 
noodle and is multilayered.
54 See, for example, PECC Trade Policy Forum 2004 and summaries in Scollay 2004.
55 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021027.html, accessed June 20, 2006. 37
Responsible for Trade considered the idea of reducing such costs by an additional 5% by 2010, though 
the modalities to achieve this were somewhat unclear.56 Interestingly, they also committed themselves 
to work on “high quality” regional and bilateral free-trade areas. In short, APEC does give a high 
priority to the adoption of “best practices,” though the road to efficiency will be a long one (and full of 
potholes).  
APEC and PECC have also been active in trying to estimate the potential benefits that might accrue 
from trade facilitation measures. For example, the APEC Economic Committee report 2004﻽﻽ Tr�de 
������������ ��d Tr�de L�ber���z�����﻽﻽ �r�m Sh��gh�� �� B�g�r (APEC 2004), offers a methodology 
developing proxies for the measurement of various trade facilitation policies, followed by some empirical 
estimation comparing trade facilitation improvements with reductions in tariffs.57 The report finds that 
the trade creation effect of tariff liberalization is greater than that of trade facilitation: when APEC 
economies liberalize tariffs by 10%, intraregional imports rise by about 2%, whereas they only rise by 
about 1% in the case of trade facilitation. However, it also suggests that trade facilitation can be an 
excellent complement to tariff reduction. 
In this section, we consider some of the more salient components of “high quality” FTAs that require 
close attention and analysis in the development of outward-oriented, efficient FTAs. 
•  Product coverage: Goods. ��mprehe���ve ��ver�ge �� be��, �� be ����uded w��h�� � re�����b�e 
per��d �f ��me (de﻽﻽�ed �� �0 ye�r� by �he GATT/WTO). Article XXIV of the GATT/WTO stipulates 
that, in an FTA or customs, product coverage should include “substantially all goods.” However, 
few FTAs cover all goods. Even NAFTA, which is comprehensive by most measures, does 
not effectively include all goods; tomatoes, for example, remain de f���� outside of the FTA. 
The US-Australia FTA, negotiated in 2004, is between two advanced countries, each actively 
involved in global liberalization of manufactured goods, agriculture, and services. Yet, sugar is 
excluded from the US-Australia FTA, and beef has a 17 year implementation period. The EU-
EFTA FTA in the 1970s excluded agricultural goods, and, actually, the US-Canada Auto Pact of 
965 only included ��e sector.. Clearly, the rigors of Article XXIV have not been very binding in 
this regard. 
Exclusions of individual products can be problematic in terms of efficiency, particularly when they 
involve products that are used as inputs in the productive chain. For example, duty free inputs 
on steel will cause exaggerated protection of value added (the “effective rate of protection”) in 
the automotive sector. Exclusion of tariffs on imported lumber will do the same in the furniture 
industry if the latter is excluded from liberalization. “Positive list” approaches tend to be the 
worst possible mechanisms in this regard, as items that would generate trade creation are 
excluded and those that would generate trade diversion (that promote intraregional trade at the 
expense of non-partners) would be included. 
Thus, to the greatest political extent possible, the FTA should include all goods. Some will no 
doubt be excluded either temporarily or permanently, but such exemptions should be as few 
as possible and should take into account the important effects that they might have on the 
effective rate of protection, as well as on trade diversion.  
•  Product coverage: Services. Again, ��mprehe���ve ��ver�ge ��d � re�����b�e ��me per��d 
f�r �mp�eme������� �re be�� from an economic perspective, and transparency is important in 
some areas. Services present some special and important challenges. Certain services are 
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56 http://www.acnnewswire.net/press/en/32057/APEC.html, accessed June 20, 2006.
57 The model used, however, is a gravity model, which has a lot of shortcomings in analyzing the effects of regional-
ism. See, for example, Frankel (1997) and Kreinin and Plummer (2002).38
fairly easy to liberalize—for example, in terms of allowing for the movement of professional 
persons,  tourist-related  services  (the  most  important  in  terms  of  exports  for  the  ASEAN 
countries, for example), and even high-tech/knowledge-based services. Others are extremely 
difficult. Educational services tend to be highly protected. Financial services are often the 
most difficult to include in any liberalization package. Even the EU, which has been a regional 
trading organization for almost a half-century and technically completed its “Single Market” 
over 10 years ago, has a long way to go before incorporating financial services at the EU level, 
despite commitments to do so.58 The same is true about postal services, which continue to be 
protected within the EU based on their “universal service obligations” but in reality due to heavy 
unionization. Within the framework of General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), some 
financial services will be included but education and postal services will be excluded due to 
their politically-sensitive nature. 
Hence, if such opposition to full inclusion of services exists in advanced developed-country 
agreements, it is obvious that certain sectors will be controversial in developed-developing 
country accords. Nevertheless, they should be included as much as possible. In fact, in many 
Asian developing countries, this could be one of the best policies for “forced” structural policy 
change in the region. Telecommunications and financial services might even be highest on the 
list of the most productive in this sense. Development of the telecommunications is extremely 
important in the functioning of a modern economy, as it serves as a key input to knowledge-
based products and services. Financial-services development is essential in modernizing the 
financial sector, increasing opportunities for savers and investors, and enhancing the integrity of 
the financial system. And given the importance of education in the modernization of instruction 
and preparing populations for a highly-competitive global economy, greater competition in this 
sector is critical in achieving the development goals of many developing (and developed) Asian 
economies. Already liberalization is taking place; the process can be enhanced through FTAs. 
For example, Singapore has long sought to increase competitiveness of its higher education in 
order to be a global competitor. Provisions laid out in the US-Singapore FTA, for example, are 
expediting this process.
 
•  Rules of Origin. Ru�e� �f �r�g�� �h�u�d be �� ��w �� p����b�e �� we�� �� �ymme�r����. “Abuses” 
of rules of origin in FTAs is the most common criticism of regional agreements by economists. 
In our discussion of existing FTAs in Asia above, we noted that developed-country agreements 
tend to be more comprehensive and “deeper.” They also have their dark sides—the darkest 
arguably the rules of origin provisions (see Table 2). Research as to how much compliance with 
rules of origin taxes efficiency is difficult to find. One estimate (Estevadeordal and Suominen 
2003) calculates the cost to be in the range of 3–5% of the free-on-board value of the exported 
goods.59
Table 3 generalizes the various approaches to determining rules of origin and their advantages 
and disadvantages (Brenton and Imagawa 2005). In contrast to developing-country accords 
such as AFTA, which tend to have simple rules of origin (usually at about 40%), the developed-
country accords tend to be extremely complicated and often very high. The US—and often the 
EU—especially insists on generally product-specific rules of origin, yielding highly-divergent 
rates. These can be used to protect domestic industry inappropriately, rather than merely 
making sure that a product is mainly produced within the region. In NAFTA, for example, the 
 
58 Foreign control—especially of retail banking is taboo in many European countries. Foreign competition in retail 
banking essentially do not exist in the biggest continental European countries—France, Germany, and Italy. Recently 
(2005), a scandal broke out in Italy when the Bank of Italy seemingly used illegal means to thwart the takeover of 
an Italian bank (Antonveneta) by a Dutch bank (ABN Ambro). Antonio Fazio, the Italian central bank governor, was 
eventually forced to resign.
59 This study is available on the PECC website: http://www.pecc.net/trade_washington.htm.39
rules of origin come to 62.5% in automobiles and essentially 100% in many textile products 
(under the “yarn forward” rule). There is also the famous (and strange) case of EU imports 
of fish: one would think that rules of origin of fish, which obviously do not have component 
imports, would be simple. But to receive access to the EU’s GSP, a developing country must 
satisfy the following conditions: (i) the vessel has to be registered in the beneficiary country or 
any EU member-state and must sail under the flag of a beneficiary/EU member; (ii) the vessel 
must be at least 60% owned by nations of the beneficiary or EU country, or by companies with 
a head office in the beneficiary of EU country, of which the chairperson and a majority of the 
board members are nationals; and (iii) the master and officers of the ship must be nationals of 
the beneficiary or EU member country, and 70% the crew must be nationals of the beneficiary 
country or the EU (Brenton and Imagawa 2005). 
Stringent rules could have important trade diversion and investment diversion effects, with a 
potentially high cost to non-partners. For example, the boom in FDI in Mexico in the automotive 
industry was no doubt due to NAFTA and no doubt came at the expensive of more efficient 
investment elsewhere in Asia. To keep these effects to a minimum and avoid the complicated 
web  knit  by  the  rules  of  origin  codes,  Singapore  worked  out  with  the  US  the  “integrated 
sourcing initiative,” in which selected products that are not made in Singapore, but exported 
through Singapore, are deemed as of Singapore origin and entitled to preferential treatment when 
exported to the US. 
•  Customs Procedures. T� �he gre��e�� ex�e�� p����b�e, �u���m� pr��edure� �h�u�d f����w 
g��b�� be�� pr�����e� ��d GATT/WTO-�������e�� pr�������. Customs and related procedures 
are at the heart of “trade facilitation,” a key priority in the Doha Development Agenda. They are 
obviously closely related to rules of origin, as one of the key challenges of customs officials is 
to clear countries-of-origin of imports. The extent of globalization of production combines with 
the need for rules of origin in the context of FTAs (and, sometimes, customs unions, if the issue 
relates to nonreciprocal agreements such as the GSP or the EU’s “everything but arms” initiative 
for Least Developed Countries) to ensure that customs procedures and related regulations form 
an essential component of any regional accord.  A key issue in the customs negotiations pertains 
to transparency and “risk management”.60 “Best practices” under WTO relate to the Agreement 
on Customs Valuation, which provides private-sector access to a review and appeal mechanism. 
Some agreements go further than the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation; for example, in the 
context of the US-Singapore FTA, the US import declaration is the only document necessary to 
prove origin.6 
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60 That is, “a systematic framework to assess the risk on goods imported which target limited resources on high risk 
goods and high risk traders while facilitating the clearance of legitimate cargoes through the checkpoints” (Chia 
2005).
6 Chia (2005).40
Table 3: Various Approaches to Rules of Origin
Rule Advantages Disadvantages Key Issues




- Consistent with    
  nonpreferential 
  rules of origin
- Once defined,   
  unambiguous 
  and easy to learn
- Relatively 
  straightforward to 
  implement
- Harmonized System not 
  designed for conferring 
  origin: there are often many 
  individual product-specific 
  rules, that can be influenced 
  by domestic industries
- Documentary requirements 
  may be difficult for 
  compliance
- Conflicts over classification 
  of goods can introduce 
  uncertainty over market 
  areas
- Level of classification at 
  which change required: 
  the higher the level, the 
  more restrictive
- Can be positive (which 
  imported inputs allowed) 
  or negative (cases 
  in which change of 
  classification won’t confer 
  origin) test: negative 
  test more restrictive
Value -added - Simple to specify 
  and 
  unambiguous
- Allows for 
  general rather 
  than product-
  specific rules 
- Complex to apply: requires 
  firms to have sophisticated 
  accounting systems
- Uncertainty due to 
  sensitivity to changes in 
  exchange rates, wages, 
  commodity prices, etc. 
- The level of value-added 
  required to confer origin
- The valuation method 
  for imported materials: 
  methods that assign a 
  higher value (e.g., CIF) 
  will be more restrictive on 





- Once defined, 
  unambiguous
- If rules can be 
  complied with, 
  provides 
  certainty
- Documentary requirements 
  can be burdensome and 
  difficult for compliance
- Leads to product-specific 
  rules
- Can quickly become 
  obsolete due to 
  technological progress and 
  require frequent modification
- The formulation of 
  the specific processes 
  required: the more 
  procedures required, the 
  more restrictive 
- Should test be negative 
  (processes or inputs that 
  can’t be used) or positive 
  (what can be used)?
Sources: Brenton, Paul and Hiroshi Imagawa, “Rules of Origin, Trade and Customs,” Chapter 9 in  De Wulf, 
Luc and José B. Sokol, �u���m� M�der��z����� H��db��k (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 
2005), Annex 9.A.
Regional  trading  agreements  can  be  used  as  instruments  to  modernize  customs  laws, 
regulations, administrative guidelines, and procedures. The most basic questions being asked 
are  (McLinden  2005,  pp.  76–77)):  (i)  has  a  process  of  continuous  review  been  created?; 
(ii) has an official process of the review and rationalization of exemptions and concessions 
been developed?; (ii) is there in place an efficient cross-agency process in applying regulatory 
requirements?; (iv) have internationally-accepted conventions and standards, including those 4
found under the WTO Valuation Agreement, been implemented? (v) do regional trading groups 
adopt internationally accepted standards and work toward regionalization of best practices?; 
and (vi) are the laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative guidelines transparent? 
If “best practices” are developed, progress in this area could be an important advantage of 
FTAs,  especially  if,  as  part  of  the  agreement,  developed  countries  help  modernize  these 
procedures, build capacity, transfer related technology, and train administrators. One does see 
this happening in such agreements, such as in the (non-preferential) US-Viet Nam Bilateral 
Trade Agreement and Japan’s New Miyazawa Plan. 
•  Intellectual  Property  Protection  (IPR):  IPR  gu�de���e�  �h�u�d  be  ���d���r�m�����ry  ��d 
�������e�� w��h TRIPS, TRIPS P�u�, ��d re���ed ���er�������� ���ve������. The protection of 
intellectual property is one of the most sensitive issues in negotiating FTAs. Developed countries, 
having a strong comparative advantage in IPR-intensive products, want to make sure that IPR 
is taken seriously both de f���� and de jure. In fact, many developing countries, including those 
that often find themselves on the US “special 301 watch list” of IPR offenders, have appropriate 
laws on the books, but lack implementation as well as enforcement. Developed countries have 
included IPR as essentially a ���e qu� ��� in bilateral FTAs. 
Developing countries often criticize the IPR stance of developed countries as being too severe 
and too favorable to innovators—for example, granting patent monopolies for an exaggerated 
amount of time, or being too insensitive in areas such as pharmaceuticals. On the other hand, it 
may be that stronger, more serious IPR protection can actually be positive for the development 
of a country’s own innovative and artistic sectors. Moreover, a new literature in the international 
investment area gives credence to the view that FDI is not only a function of IPR protection, but 
also influences the sector distribution of FDI and the degree of technology transfer. Countries 
with stronger IPR protection tend to receive more FDI in sectors in which technology transfer 
is more likely. 
In any event, the extent to which IPR-related clauses within an FTA reinforce international 
conventions, the more likely the accord will support multilateralism, provided, of course, that 
the clauses are nondiscriminatory across countries. 
•  Foreign direct investment. I�ve��me��-re���ed pr�v������ �h�u�d embr��e �������� �re��me��, 
���d���r�m�������, �hu� perf�rm���e requ�reme���, ��d h�ve � h�gh�y-����u��ve �eg���ve ����, 
�� we�� �� pr�v�de �he u�u�� pr��e����� �e�e���ry f�r f�re�g� ��ve���r�. As was noted above, 
Asian countries generally place a strong emphasis on FDI, and having liberal, nondiscriminatory 
provisions tend to be less controversial than in the case of other developing regions. Exceptions 
might exist with respect to FDI in state-owned enterprises and “sensitive” sectors. This is true not 
only for developing Asia but also developed countries: state-owned enterprises have traditionally 
restricted significantly FDI penetration in areas such as defense, public morals, the media, and 
certain other sectors of high “national security” or “national sovereignty” importance. The US, 
for example, is only now considering allowing significant FDI in its airline industry. Hence, every 
country will have “negative lists” with respect to FDI. This will always be true with or without 
FTAs. For our purposes, we would stress that pacts should keep them to a minimum. 
Also, it is important that the accords embrace national treatment, thereby not giving preferential 
treatment  to  local  relative  to  foreign  firms.  This  has  important  implications  for  creating  a 
competitive environment. Further, with respect to the “outward orientation” of the agreement, 
nondiscrimination v��-à-v�� non-partners is also essential in creating a level playing field. For 42
example, in the US-Thai Treaty of Amity, Thailand gives certain preferences to US firms that 
are not accorded to multinational affiliates of other countries. This part of the agreement has 
expired; it will no doubt be an area of discussion in the ongoing US-Thai FTA negotiations.  
•  Anti-dumping. A���-dump��g pr��edure� ��d d��pu�e re���u���� �eed �� be �r���p�re�� ��d 
f��r, ��d �he pr��e�� �eed� �� be we�� �pe��﻽﻽ed ��d effe���ve. Anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties, also known as “administrative actions,” have been condemned as an important weapon 
in the arsenal of the “new protectionism.” Anti-dumping duties have mainly been used by 
developed countries but some developing countries have begun to use them as well. Anti-
dumping measures may or may not be stipulated directly in an agreement; sometimes, the 
references may be exclusively directed to the WTO dispute resolution. Anti-dumping clauses 
in an FTA might be used as a means to tighten anti-dumping evaluations procedures, promote 
transparency,  and  expedite  any  processes.  But  it  also  important  that  dispute  settlement 
procedures be clearly identified and respected. Otherwise, confusion can follow. The most 
obvious example of this problem is the ongoing dispute between the US and Canada regarding 
softwood lumber exports from the latter to the former. The US claims that Canadian loggers 
have been given unfair subsidies (mainly in the form of subsidies stumping fees in state-owned 
forests), whereas the Canadians argue that the Americans are exaggerating this effect and, in 
effect, the US also subsidies their lumber industry. A NAFTA panel ruled in favor of Canada; a 
recent WTO panel has now (2005) ruled in favor of the US. There continues to be uncertainly 
as to what the next step will be in the process. In the meantime, US-Canadian trade relations 
are arguably at an all-time low, despite having an FTA since 1989.  
•  Government procurement. G�ver�me�� pr��ureme�� �h�u�d be �pe� ��d �� ���d���r�m�����ry 
�� p����b�e, ��d pr��edure� �h�u�d be ��e�r ��d �� �pe� �� p����b�e. 
•  Competition.  P�����e�  re���ed  ��  ��mpe������  �h�u�d  �re��e  �  “�eve�  p��y��g  ﻽﻽e�d”  f�r  b��h 
re��de��� ��d p�r��er�, ��d �hey �h�u�d ��� pu� ���-p�r��er ��mpe������ �� � d���dv����ge. 
•  Technical Barriers to Trade. The�e �h�u�d be kep� �� � m���mum, w��h ��e�r ��d �r���p�re�� 
me�h����m� f�r de�erm������� �f ����d�rd�. The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) attempts to “ensure that technical negotiations and standards, as well as testing 
and certification procedures, do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade.” TBT takes on 
particular  significance  at  the  global  level,  as  many  of  its  aspects,  including  harmonizing 
standards, “mutual recognition,” defining what are legitimate means of protecting, such as 
animal and plant life and the environment, among others, should have global rules of conduct. 
International standards, however, are bound to be general; FTAs, as they only involve a few 
or several countries, can potentially achieve far deeper means of integration and progress in 
this area. What would be critical for efficiency and outward-orientation, therefore, would be 
that any TBT clauses in FTAs should be based on international standards, have high levels of 
transparency, embrace best practices, and eschew discrimination against outsiders as much as 
possible.62 The Uruguay Round created a “Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption 
and Application of Standards” by standardizing bodies; FTAs should build on these, or at least 
not contradict them. 
In sum, by adopting best-practices, Asian FTAs could generate significant gains in terms of economic 
efficiency, well-beyond the effects of traditional FTAs (which can potentially be welfare-inhibiting) and, 
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62 As one would essentially always have trade diversion in an FTA (one way or another), the same is true of harmo-
nization of standards within a regional group. When the EU launched its Single Market Program beginning in 1986, 
for example, one major aspect was the harmonization of standards and professional qualifications, thereby making a 
truly regional market. A European standard, however, cannot be completely a global one.43
arguably, beyond what any realistic multilateral approach could possibly hope to generate.  How much 
is “significant”? This would be difficult, indeed, to model. However, the EC’s Single Market Programme, 
which did not focus entirely on best practices but is largely devoted to improving efficiency through 
the harmonization of the types of policies including in this section, was estimated (Cecchini 1988) to 
increase EC GDP by up to 6.5%. Moreover, in order to compare traditional estimates—induced by 
liberalization of tariff and tariff-equivalent nontariff barriers—of gains due to trade liberalization in Asia 
(Scenario 1) and more general trade-cost reduction effects such as improving customs clearance, 
lower transaction costs, and facilitation of international market access (Scenario 2), Brooks, Roland-
Holst and Zhai (2005) run simulations to compare the aggregate impact on real income, exports, and 
terms of trade.63 They assume that non-policy-related trade costs are around 120% and are cut by half 
over a 20-year period for East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.64 The results are illuminating. 
Under Scenario 1, real income rises in the range of 0.9–2.9% for East Asia, 1.9– 6.6% for Southeast 
Asia, and 0.3–0.6% for South Asia. Under Scenario 2, the gains are many times as large, that is, 
8.1–53.8%, 35.5–116.6%, and 10.4–22.4%, respectively.
Hertel, Walmsley, and Itakura (200) go even further in their analysis of the potential gains from the 
Japan-Singapore FTA. They essentially develop a dynamic Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)-based 
model using an ex ���e simulation but with some ex p��� features in estimating what we’ve defined 
above as dynamic and policy relationships in the model. Thus, they add to traditional trade barrier 
effects the harmonization of e-commerce standards, liberalizing rules in trade in services, automating 
customs services in Japan (to be consistent with Singapore), and investment flows. Interestingly, given 
the nature of this “new age” agreement, all regions of the world gain, including, of course, Japan and 
Singapore. Fully 70% of the gains accrue to Japan (a good share of which due to improved customs 
services). Hertel, et. al. stress that it is precisely the “new age features” which drive the positive results 
for all—and these are just a few of the possible areas we delineate above, as well as being between 
two advanced countries with less to gain from “best practices”. 
IV. To What Degree Are Existing Arrangements in Asia Consistent with 
     Minimizing the Spaghetti-Bowl Effect?
To what degree do the regional accords listed in Table 2 conform with the “best-practices” outlined in 
Section III? In this section, we address this question by evaluating the existing accords, delineated in 
Table 2, and then “rating” them according to the areas analyzed in Section III. In gauging how well a 
specific agreement meets our “best practices” definition, we assign “letter grades”, in which 
•  “A” deems that the agreement generally conforms to our criteria and does not contradict GATT/
WTO principles; 
•  “B” signifies that the agreement is an approximation of best-practices, but there is room for 
improvement;
•  “C” would suggest that the agreement has many “holes” in it; is possibly “inward-looking”; and/
or has certain potentially problematic features;
•  “D” implies that the agreement is, indeed, inward-looking and potentially disruptive to international 
trade; and 
•  “I” (for “incomplete”) denotes that the area is basically excluded from the agreement.   
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63 Brooks, Roland-Holst and Zhai (2005) model the Scenario 2 liberalization as an “iceberg effect,” in which a fraction 
of goods and services“melt away in transit due to the trade costs” (p. 4, fn 4).
64 It is important to note that this value is a guesstimate and is not derived systematically or empirically.44
Of course, such a rating scheme will have to be somewhat subjective; each agreement is sufficiently 
nuanced as to preclude confident generalizations and uniformity of evaluation. However, it is hoped 
that such a rating scale will give an idea as to how closely the various agreements come to minimizing 
the  costs  of  discrimination  inherent  in  FTA  and  maximize  the  benefits  of  regional  cooperation. 
Nevertheless, we d� ��� calculate a “grade point average” for each accord; this would require a far 
too subjective rating scale. An example might illustrate the problem. We can compare AFTA and the 
US-Singapore in terms of their respective (i) product coverage in services; and (ii) rules of origin. As 
will be seen below, we would give respectively to AFTA and US-Singapore a C and an A for category 
(i), and a A- and a C for category (ii). We are bold enough to do this, as services in the US-Singapore 
agreement are covered extensively, whereas in AFTA they do not appear in specific terms except in 
a limited manner in the ASEAN Framework on Services (AFS), which has a long way to go; the US-
Singapore agreement has complicated rules of origin provisions, whereas the AFTA agreement is far 
more transparent (it receives an “A-“ only because its 40% rules of origin is not as “low as possible”). 
But how would we calculate an average grade for the two? We could impose symmetry, and assign 
a 50% weight to each. But who is to say that services are as important as rules of origin in an FTA? 
Services would tend to expand the potential benefits of the FTA, in terms of trade creation and trade 
facilitation and other means of enhanced efficiency, but rules of origin could be highly significant if they 
lead to greater trade diversion. They are apples and oranges; hence, we choose not to mix them.
It is apparent from this analysis that most FTAs involving developed countries tend to receive high 
marks with the exception of one category—rules of origin. Comparative analysis of the agreements in 
this area is extremely difficult due to the complicated nature of the subject and the product-by-product 
approach of the various agreements. Estevadeordal and Suominen (2005) attempt to do this for several 
of the pacts we discussed, including AFTA, Japan-Singapore, US-Singapore, and Singapore-New 
Zealand (as well as others).65 Their analysis supports our conclusions below, that is, these accords do 
have restrictive rules of origin clauses, with the exception of AFTA. 
As a final introductory consideration, it behooves us to consider why these agreements tend to exhibit 
so much diversity. Several points are relevant here. First, we should not exaggerate too much the 
differences. On the whole, by global standards we would judge most of these agreements to be 
generally outward-looking. This reflects the commercial policy stance of governments in the region,—in 
the direction of greater openness. It certainly would make little sense if, say, the ASEAN countries were 
pursuing economic reform and unilateral liberalization at the national level but, for some unexplained 
reason, they would opt to contradict this stance in AFTA by creating a “fortress.” Given that the technical 
personnel and high-level policy makers in the trade and trade-related ministries tend to be the same 
people, such a schizophrenic approach would be hard to contemplate. This is not say that protectionist 
forces do not exert their interests; they do, and this is present in all agreements, be they regional or 
multilateral. But the thrust of these agreements is outward-looking, particularly when compared to 
other regions.
Second, the comparative advantage of large developed countries has changed such that their export 
interests are increasingly in the services sectors, which can account for over three-fourths of GDP 
and over one-third of exports. This ensures that behind-the-border measures, such as IPR protection, 
liberalization and protection of foreign investment and related mode 3 measures, and sensitive services 
sectors such as telecommunications, financial services, and even education, will be included in FTAs 
with developed countries, especially the US, but also Japan. Foreign direct investment in general is 
also another important topic for these countries, as their multinationals see FTAs as an important 
way to acquire a competitive edge in the globalization process. Moreover, large developed countries 
in the region (Japan) and outside the region (especially the US and EU) will continue to try to resist 
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the inclusion of certain products in which they have lost comparative advantage, especially highly-
sensitive agricultural products. 
Third, the smaller developed countries in the region—Australia and New Zealand—certainly have the 
same incentives as the other developed countries to include the behind-the-border sectors as well, but 
given their size may not have the clout to impose inclusion of such sectors. Moreover, they differ from 
the other developed countries in that they have a strong comparative advantage in agriculture and, 
hence, are in favor of more comprehensive product coverage in goods, something that is not always 
reciprocated, however, in their negotiations with other countries.  
Fourth, most developing-country (“South-South”) accords tend to be far less “legalistic” and more 
informal than trade agreements in which developed countries are included. This has much to do with 
weaker formal institutions in some of the developing countries and, often, the overriding importance of 
the political aspects of integration (discussed below). This is why there appears to be a tendency on 
the part of multinational firms and other players to discount the value of accords between developing 
countries. However, increasingly developing countries are accepting the reality that more structure, 
transparency, firm rules, and “depth” will be necessary if the goals of trade pacts are to be realized. 
The evolution of ASEAN integration is an excellent case in point. 
Fifth, as was noted above, the noneconomic motivations for these agreements have an important 
bearing on the number and scope of the agreements. An in-depth analysis of the political and strategic 
motivations of these accords is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to note that the motivations 
may be part of a strategic regional vision (such as the developed countries and the PRC), a strategic 
global vision (the US, Mexico, and Singapore), fear of being left behind (the “defensive” FTAs of the 
ASEAN countries and, arguably, Australia and New Zealand), or could be �u� ge�er�� in nature. 
Table 4 presents the grades that we would assign to each sector/issue and each agreement. In addition, 
we give some evaluating comments on the more significant agreements. 
1. AFTA (multiple protocols: January 1992–January 2003). We reviewed the evolution of ASEAN 
economic cooperation extensively above. It should be noted, however, that relative to all “Full FTAs,” 
AFTA is the most difficult to track and evaluation, as it really does manifest itself in pieces. While many 
of the other Full FTAs are hundreds of pages long, the AFTA agreement, signed 28 January 1992, 
comes to approximately four pages, supplemented by an additional six pages outlining the workings of 
the Common Accepted Preferential Tariff (CEPT)—the means by which tariff demobilization would take 
place. The agreement has several additional protocols and amendments, including those necessary 
to include the accessions of the transitional ASEAN countries in the mid-late-1990s. These have 
broadened the coverage of AFTA significantly over the years, defining “temporary exclusions lists” and 
means for their inclusion over time,66 expedite the integration process; deepen CEPT tariff cuts within 
the AFTA framework from 0–5% to 0% (as of the “Protocol on the CEPT” signed 31 January 2003); and 
eventually foster other areas of cooperation under the AFS, AIA/AIC, and so on. In this sense it is the 
least “transparent” of the Full FTAs; however, it does demonstrate an evolutionary drive toward closer 
integration, which is consistent with the ASEAN approach to economic integration. Moreover, as noted 
above, a main goal of the ASEAN Charter, supported at the Kuala Lumpur Heads of State Summit in 
December 2005, will likely be to integrate these many documents.  
It is also noteworthy that, in Article I of AFTA, the agreement specifies explicitly that “Member States 
shall endeavor to strengthen their economic cooperation through an outward-looking attitude so that 
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Singapore, 30 September 1999, all products on the temporary exclusion lists should be included by 2010 for the 
ASEAN-6, and up to 2017 for the transitional ASEAN countries.46
their cooperation contributes to the promotion of global trade liberalization.” No other agreement 
has such a clear statement in favor of open regionalism as its absolute first priority. In fact, ASEAN 
members have been lowering their external barriers at the same time that they have been liberalizing 
intraregional barriers through CEPT, thereby reducing any potential marginal-of-preference that could 
lead to trade diversion. This is also true for investment flows; FDI is largely being liberalized on a 
nondiscriminatory basis.  
Table 4: Grading Existing FTAs in Asia
Accord Goods Serv. ROO GovPro Comp Inv.  IPR Mon TBT
1. AFTA   A C A- I I A-  I C I
2. SGP-NZ A B A- B+ A A A A A
3. EFTA-SGP C A C B+ B A A A B
4. JPN-SGP A A C A B A A A B
5. US-SGP A A C A A A A A A
6. AUS-SGP A A C A A A A A A
7. KOR-CHLE B B C A A A A A A
8. JPN-MEX A B C A A A A A A
9. THAI-AUS A B C B- A A A A A
10. INDIA-SGP B B C C C B+ C A A
11. KOR-SGP B B+ C A A A A A A
Notes:
1. Goods=Trade in Goods; Serv=Trade in Services; ROO=Rules of Origin; GovPro=Government Procurement 
(chapter/clauses); Comp=Competition (chapter/clauses); Inv.=FDI provisions; IPR=Intellectual Property 
Protection (WTO TRIPs plus related conventions); Mon=Monitoring and dispute settlement provisions; 
TBT=Technical Barriers to Trade.
2. Grading is based on: consistency with WTO and outward-orientation; best-practices; scope.  
2. Singapore-New Zealand (ANZSCEP; 182 pages, including annexes; November 2000). New Zealand 
has evolved substantially over the past 20 years, from one of the most inward-looking economies in 
the OECD to one of the most outward-oriented. Hence, this accord is between two sophisticated, 
developed economies. And this is demonstrated in the high marks for the accord. It is outward-oriented 
and comprehensive, in terms of both goods and services.  Even the rules of origin, which is based on 
either tariff transformation or a simple 40% rule, is liberal relative to other accords involving developed 
countries. It is interesting that the agreement actually refers to APEC commitments (under national 
treatment and coverage in services) in anticipation of the 200 “deadline” (Article 20:4); they also refer 
to APEC nonbinding rules under government procurement, rather than the relevant WTO protocol. In 
terms of transparency, the agreement is fairly straightforward, with the exception of services, which 
leaves quite a bit open. “MFN status” is explicitly included in the investment section. The “technical 
barriers” section is particularly advanced (and takes up a relatively large part of the agreement). The 
part on “intellectual property” merely refers to WTO protocols.
3. EFTA-Singapore (590 pages, 545 of which comprise annexes; entered into force January 2003). 
This is a plurilateral agreement, in that the European Free Trade Area has had a FTA for over 30 
years, and is between developed, sophisticated economies. The agreement essentially only covers 
manufactured products (Chapters 25–97 of the HS system) and, as such, is fairly restrictive in terms 
of goods. This comes as no surprise; one of the main reasons the remaining EFTA countries have not 
joined the EU relates to agriculture, which is even more protected in EFTA than it is in the EU. It is, 
therefore, no coincidence that city-state Singapore is unique as an FTA partner of EFTA in Asia. Sanitary 47
and Phytosanitary measures are simple and insist on nondiscrimination, but do nothing in terms of 
attempted harmonization of further cooperation. Competition-related clauses, including anti-dumping 
and those affecting state-owned enterprises, refer to WTO protocols, with a commitment (Article 50) 
to eschew any anti-competitive practices. By far the largest part of the actual text refers to trade in 
services; scope, as defined in Annex VII, includes considerable detail on professional (and business-
related) services and tends to be quite liberal in this regard, consistent with other Singapore FTAs. Postal 
services are included, as are telecommunications—that is, those outside the purview of the Singapore 
Broadcasting Authority Act—and market access considerations for broadband multimedia (no doubt, 
a high priority for Nokia) to be reviewed in the future, leaving ambiguity (but EFTA is protected in the 
Singapore market by its MFN clause in the agreement’s text). Limited progress appears to have been 
made on educational services in terms of mutual recognition, and university education is excluded 
(though secondary and post-secondary technical and vocational education are included). Coverage of 
financial services is broad. The investment agreement is fairly standard, with a strong emphasis not 
only on national treatment but also MFN (also the case with services and IPR protection). Government 
procurement provisions are strictly WTO-related. 
4. Japan-Singapore FTA (JSEPA; January 2002; 512 pages, of which 432 annexes). Many of the 
same provisions found in the EFTA-Singapore FTA are found in this one as well, though coverage, 
particularly in the goods sector, is more comprehensive. Interestingly, earlier on in the agreement 
(Article 6), Japan and Singapore anticipate any potential “spaghetti bowl” problems, noting that any 
apparent contradiction between this and any other agreement shall be immediately addressed. Anti-
dumping is not included in the agreement but rather relegated to WTO rules. Rules of origin tend to be 
product-specific and fairly complicated, which is actually the only drawback in a liberal, straightforward 
agreement. On the other hand, the emphasis on “paper trading” in this agreement (Chapter 5) suggests 
an advanced approach to trade facilitation. Services coverage is generally extensive (and, as in other 
accords, includes MNF clauses, though the language tends to be less direct). However, business 
practices (Article 66) are less explicitly detailed than in the case of the EFTA-Singapore FTA. It is 
noteworthy, however, that the parties agree to cooperate on the building of “capital markets,” which 
would appear to be manifesting itself not only on a bilateral level but within the APT process. Joint 
human-resource development is also a priority. Investment is fully covered, and dispute settlement is 
transparent and clear (Article 82). IPR protection is relegated to the WTO TRIPs agreement (Article 86) 
but is expanded at length in Chapter 10. In fact, the IPR provisions in the Japanese and US FTAs with 
Singapore are highly advanced in this respect. Mutual recognition of professional persons is spelled 
out in detail, as is (short-term) movement of “natural” persons. Government procurement is WTO-
based, and includes a liberal threshold of SDR100,000. The parties vow to avoid anti-competitive 
behavior (Articles 103–104), but resolutions of related disputes are not clear from the agreement (they 
are to wait for the “Implementing Agreement”).
5. US-Singapore FTA (USSFTA; 240 pages plus annexes; May 2003). As noted above, the USSFTA is 
thought to be one of the most modern FTAs in the world. The US has explicitly expressed its intentions 
to use it as a model for accords with other ASEAN countries (under the “Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative”) 
and is no doubt a benchmark for other accords is either negotiating or contemplating in the region. 
Hence, its “efficiency” and “openness” are of the essence, given the importance of the US in the 
global economy. Coverage of goods is comprehensive, though it devotes an entire chapter (Chapter 
5) to textiles and apparel; with a view to ensuring that “trade deflection” will not take place through 
Singapore. Singapore, for its part, was able to negotiate a waiver on rules of origin for about two-dozen 
products under its “Integrated sourcing Initiative.”67 Services coverage is also comprehensive, going 
somewhat beyond the other Singapore accords noted above (especially in terms of banking services 
and capital controls). As is the case with all US FTAs, the rules of origin tend to be complicated. The   
67 Even “chewing gum” found its way into the agreement by way of compromise. Chewing gum had been banned in 
Singapore, but the US claimed this was a sort of technical barrier to trade. An agreement was struck whereby US 
chewing gum can be sold in Singapore…in pharmacies.48
anti-competition clause is better developed than in the case of the other accords, as is IPR protection. 
An entire Chapter is devoted to Technical Barriers to Trade, with references especially to the WTO 
but also APEC. Controversially, labor and the environment each have Chapters in this agreement, 
a result of political realities in the US. However, the compromise agreement turned out to be fairly 
uncontroversial (and will be a model for other accords, no doubt): Singapore agrees merely to serious 
implementation of its �w� laws v��-à-v�� labor and the environment. They also vow not to increase 
competitiveness by lowering standards in any of these areas. 
6. Australia-Singapore (SAFTA; 117 pages plus annexes; 2003). Our final Singapore-based bilateral 
agreement with a developed country, Australia, exhibits many of the same features as the agreements 
above, particularly ANZSCEP. This is no doubt a result of the “Closer Economic Relations” FTA between 
Australia and New Zealand, which is highly-comprehensive and has been effective in linking the two 
countries’ economies. Symmetry in the agreements was, therefore, important in order not to cause any 
trade deflection or other “spaghetti-bowl” effects. Coverage of goods and services is comprehensive; 
in fact, services, such as financial services and telecommunications services, are arguably even better 
developed in this agreement. Anti-dumping is essentially WTO-based, as are safeguards. Rules of 
origin are complicated, but somewhat less so than in the US case; various rules apply, and percentage 
of value added is generally defined either as 30% (for selected goods) or 50% (for all other goods). 
Rules on government procurement are fairly elaborate, but references to WTO protocol somewhat 
vague and noncommittal (Article 18). Investment, competition, TBT, and dispute settlement are fairly 
standard and well-developed in this agreement. IPR protection builds on WTO TRIPS.    
7. Korea-Chile (130 pages; signed February 2003). While Chile has many FTAs in place, this accord 
was the very first FTA for Korea. It may appear strange that Korea would choose Chile as its first 
preferential  partner,  particularly  since  Chile’s  share  of  Korean  trade  and  investment  is  so  small. 
But in the main this was more of “starter agreement” for Korea, a means to begin the process of 
incorporating FTAs in its commercial policy with an “easy country,” to which sensitive sectors in Korea 
would be minimally exposed. While manufactured goods are essentially covered, agriculture products 
are restricted. Rules of origin are complicated. The agreement does build on many WTO protocols, 
including in the areas of anti-dumping, sanitary, and phytosanitary measures, IPR protection, trade-
related investment measures, and technical barriers to trade. The investment agreement, with replaces 
an earlier “BIT,” takes up a more than commensurate share of the agreement (relative to the others) and 
is fairly exhaustive in its coverage of investment issues. Services liberalization, however, is incomplete 
and somewhat piecemeal. Quantitative restrictions are allowed, and financial services are excluded. 
Telecommunications are included, but mainly only ensure guaranteed access to local services. 
8. Japan-Mexico FTA (135 pages; signed September 2004). Bilateral trade and investment between 
Mexico and Japan is small for each as a percent of their respective totals. However, each counts the 
US as its most important economic partner, at least at the signing of the agreement.68 Given NAFTA, 
the usefulness of this agreement to Japan is clear, and Japan, being the second largest economy in 
the world and a major source of FDI, was an attractive partner for Mexico. In addition, Mexico has 
been seeking to diversify its trade and investment partners (currently the US is dominant, particularly 
in trade, for which the US market accounts for approximately 80% of total Mexican trade). NAFTA also 
made an FTA with Japan easier; many of the same components manifest themselves in this agreement. 
Coverage is similar to the Japan-Singapore FTA and other modern FTAs mentioned above. Financial 
services are included but are geared more to cross-border trade in financial services, rather than a 
“deep” approach to integration of the sector. Telecommunications are excluded altogether. Government 
procurement is covered extensively, including the creation of a “sub-committee” to monitor and ensure 
that the provisions of the agreement are respected. There is little written with respect to trade-labor 
concerns (especially relative to NAFTA and other US accords) but there is an explicit commitment to 
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not use environmental measures in order to attract FDI (Article 74). Monitoring and dispute settlement 
are clear and receive attention throughout the Agreement. “Competition” is included (Chapter 12) but 
the Agreement only outlines general guidelines of comportment. 
9. Thailand-Australia FTA (118 pages, excluding annexes; 2004). As both Thailand and Australia are 
major exporters of agricultural goods, this side of the agreement was easier to reach than was the case 
for many of the other accords (except, of course, the Singapore agreements). Services liberalization, 
however, is not comprehensive. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures, as well as technical barriers to 
trade, are dealt with in-depth. Investment and competition policies are included as separate chapters 
(Chapter 9 and Chapter 12, respectively). Government procurement is included, but its provisions are 
not clear: it establishes the creation of a working group with a general mandate to give recommendations. 
IPR protection focuses on WTO protocols, with additional general commitments to protection. 
Limited  and  Emerging Agreements:  ECOTA,  the  Proposed  SAFTA  (January  2004),  and  the 
Proposed Transpacific Strategic Economic Partnership (June 2005). The main goal of ECOTA was 
to (i) reduce barriers to international trade, particularly in the areas of nontariff and technical barriers; 
(ii) integrate the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) such that the region would become more 
competitive internationally; and (iii) boost intraregional trade, which was only at approximately 7% of 
total trade at the time the agreement was signed. The agreement itself was not easy to reach, given 
the extreme diversity of the organization, from countries with highly-developed commercial policies 
such as Turkey (which has a customs union with the EU) to those with emerging policies in Central 
Asia (and Afghanistan, which is a member of ECO). The low intraregional trade share was a reflection 
both of barriers to trade, especially high and unpredictable border fees and other nontariff barriers, 
and the fact that the region has comparative advantage in many of the same industries, which in turn 
are characterized by inter-industry trade. Hence, in practice the goal of increasing intraregional trade 
should have been secondary; defining “boosting intraregional trade” as a goal in the Treaty of Izmir 
(establishing ECO) could potentially be problematic if it were to take place through trade diversion. 
And while there is a good deal of market-friendly and outward-looking aspects to ECOTA, it remains 
an incomplete agreement in many aspects. Agriculture is essentially excluded, as are all sensitive 
manufacturing goods (in fact, the agreement appears to take a “positive list” approach to integration, 
similar to the ASEAN PTA). Rules of origin still need to be worked out, as well as the tariff demobilization 
component. In sum, listing ECOTA in Table 4 would have required a number of Ds, Is, and question 
marks, so we deemed it best to exclude it until it is better developed. 
The SAFTA agreement came into force  July 2006, after “completion of formalities” and various 
ratification measures are completed in the member states (although Pakistan decided not to immediately 
implement the accord). This suggests that, if sufficient political will is mustered, the agreement will 
eventually emerge; but, at present, it is essentially a framework agreement that would lead up to an 
FTA. For example, rules of origin are not specified; the agreement just mentions that they are to be 
negotiated (Article 18). Product coverage remains unclear, though the tariff demobilization process is 
specified. One prominent feature of the agreement regards “special and differential treatment” for the 
Least Developed Countries of SARRC, which are among the poorest in the world. 
In addition to the South Asian Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA), which is a highly-limited regional 
trading accord that was negotiated a decade ago, India also has like agreements with MERCOSUR 
(January 2004; 12 pages) and Nepal (December 1991; 9 pages). We exclude these from the table 
given their lack of significant content in terms of actual liberalization.  
The Transpacific Strategic Economic Partnership, comprising Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, 
and Singapore, would appear to be modern FTA, replete with references to WTO and APEC protocols. 50
This FTA would have to be extensive given the member-states; Singapore, for example, already has 
an FTA with each of these countries. But like SAFTA, the Agreement has left much to be worked out, 
and its date of implementation is unclear (the Parties have 6 months from 5 June 2005 to sign the 
Agreement). However, the text as it now stands would suggest an outward-oriented, comprehensive 
agreement between these four small countries.
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Research 
In a controversial academic piece in the Amer���� E����m�� Rev�ew (but widely circulated beforehand), 
Andrew Rose tests the hypothesis of whether or not the WTO has really made a difference in stimulating 
world trade (Rose 2004). Using a gravity model of international trade, he rejects this hypothesis. In 
other words, over the 1948–2000 period, being a member of the WTO had no statistically-significant 
effect on influencing bilateral trade, when one controls for other relatively standard variables. Now, 
while few would doubt the analytical robustness of the article (the Amer���� E����m�� Rev�ew has 
arguably the most rigorous academic review process in the US), the piece has been criticized from a 
variety of angles, including the fact that it focuses on overall bilateral trade, rather than trade by sectors. 
One certainly wouldn’t expect a significant WTO effect in agriculture, textiles, and clothing, and other 
protected sectors that have basically remained outside of the GATT/WTO liberalization process. Still, 
that is his point: the GATT/WTO has not done enough.
On the other hand, Rose 2004 does find strong effects in terms of the importance of regional trade 
agreements such as FTAs and customs unions, and especially monetary union. His results in this 
sense are consistent with the by now huge stock of empirical research on the determinants of trade 
and even investment flows using gravity models. These models generally do not tell us whether or not 
the effects of regional integration are due to trade creation or trade diversion, though the impressive 
internationalization of the world economy would certainly suggest that the former dominates the latter.69   
No doubt this is due to the fact that these regional trading agreements promote far deeper integration 
between countries, including not only many sensitive sectors hitherto unaffected by the WTO but also 
nontariff, non-border, regulatory, and other trade- and investment-related policies. 
In fact, the economics literature, as well as the GATT/WTO Rounds themselves, placed far too much 
emphasis on tariffs. It is true that they are easiest to analyze (for economic models) and negotiate (for 
policy markers) but they are no longer the most important obstacles to international trade. In fact they 
have become increasingly irrelevant, and with them much of the standard “trade creation and trade 
diversion” approach to estimating the worthiness of a regional trading agreement. According to the 
World Bank (2005, p. 66), the average tariff of NAFTA countries comes to approximately 3% and that 
of AFTA, slightly less than 5%. Obviously, the effects of these FTAs, for better or worse, will ultimately 
not be decided by the usual net efficiency calculations. The economics of FTAs have become far too 
complicated and, generally speaking, economic analysis and negotiators have often failed to keep 
pace. 
In any event, the regionalism trend is here to stay. Regardless of the argumentative merits of the 
pro- and anti-regionalism camp, it is a “fact on the ground” that preferential trading agreements, 
in particular FTAs, have been flourishing. There are myriad reasons behind this movement, with 
convincing economic, political-economy, and strictly political arguments. But this does not mean that 
evaluating regionalism is the economic equivalent of counting how many angles can dance on the 
head of a pin. An inward-approach to regional economic cooperation could pose serious risks to the 
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ments, be they ex ante or ex post, tend to generate net trade creation. See Frankel (1997) and Kreinin and Plummer 
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countries espousing them as well as to the international marketplace. Given that all major countries 
now subscribe to regional trading accords to various degrees, this suggests a threat that must be 
evaluated with continued vigilance.  
A successful conclusion to the Doha Development Agenda, we have argued, would be very favorable to 
the global economy. With respect to the regionalism movement, not only would it, perhaps, strengthen 
openness rules on Article XXIV beyond the 1994 GATT Understanding, but it would also mitigate the 
effects of discrimination inherent in regionalism. We believe that Doha should receive the highest 
possible priority from its member-states. Unfortunately, talks were suspended in July 2006.
However, not even a successful Doha would have likely turned back the clock on bilateral and regional 
FTAs. Even if we leave aside the diplomatic and political-economy aspects of regionalism that tend 
to support the movement, there will remain salient economic influences that will continue to make 
bilateral, regional and plurilateral FTAs and other forms of regional economic cooperation attractive. 
Hence, it behooves economists to accept regionalism as a reality, and proscribe means to ensure that 
the trend be consistent with global market integration as well as being as efficient as possible in terms 
of minimizing costs associated with this second-best commercial policy. 
This has been the main goal of this paper. In addition to evaluating regionalism itself in light of its 
relative merits and sustainability, we developed a general blueprint to gauge to what degree FTAs meet 
efficiency criteria and applied them to the case of Asian FTAs, both intraregional and with partners 
outside the region. 
Our main conclusions from our review of the agreements themselves were several: 
•  “Full FTAs” in Asia have tended to be of the “building bloc” rather than the “stumbling bloc” type, 
though there are some (minor) exceptions in the terms of certain components; 
•  many of the FTAs that Asian countries have negotiated tend to be “modern” and among the 
most sophisticated in the world, including a wide set of sectors, integration mechanisms, and 
non-border policies; 
•  the agreements themselves, particularly those between Singapore and developed countries 
(such as Japan and the US), are liberal, with the exception of rules of origin. In fact, outside of 
rules of origin, we would argue that these accords generally unequivocally support the WTO 
system in most of their provisions, rather than conflict with it; with respect to the more limited 
FTAs, however, the restricted scope and selectivity of non-border areas can be problematic; 
and 
•  while Asian countries score better than most other FTAs in the international marketplace in 
terms of their matching a “blueprint” minimizing the costs associated with overlapping accords 
and consistency (the “spaghetti bowl effect”), progress could be made in this area.
This paper is merely a first step in trying to chart effective strategies to minimize the “spaghetti-bowl” 
effects of regionalism and ensure that Asia becomes an exemplary region in terms of its embrace of 
outward-oriented regionalism. Several additional lines of research would include:
•  Be��er ex-p��� m�de���g of existing trade agreements in Asia, particularly ASEAN. While there 
is an abundance of ex ���e models, which in this piece we argue can be sometimes counter-
productive, little has been done using ex p��� modeling, outside of gravity models which are 
limited in their applicability. Studies along these lines would include: (i) a general survey of the 
static and dynamic modeling, both ex ���e and ex p���, to date in the Asia-Pacific literature, with 
a clear methodological comparison and analytical scrutiny (perhaps to include ex p��� validation 
of ex ���e estimation); (ii) given the relatively paucity of ex p��� models, the development of a 
comprehensive, common ex p��� approach to modeling the effects of Asian bilateral accords 
(for which there exist sufficient data); and (iii) at the sector level, a study testing the hypothesis 52
as to whether or not FTAs have actually led to the “weeding out” process discussed above in 
the context of the “building blocs” versus “stumbling blocs” debate. 
•  Be��er emp�r���� m�de���g of the costs of certain components of FTAs that tend to be “stumbling 
blocs.” We noted above that there are many critics of regionalism that assume the costs of the 
spaghetti-bowl effect are large, without any actual formal estimates. One study cited in this 
paper suggests that compliance with rules of origin in FTAs can cost 3–5% of the fob value of 
exports; more such studies need to be done, including simple interviewing. During the course 
of this study, the author interviewed European customs officials regarding the costs of the EU 
“pyramid of preferences,” a spaghetti-bowl if there ever was one. No official believed that the 
costs were high, given the organization of customs clearance in Europe. Studies of this nature 
could include partial equilibrium estimates as well as general equilibrium approaches, such as 
expanded approaches to the Hertel et. al. (2005) model. 
•  M�re re�e�r�h �� ��ve��me�� ���ue� �� �TA�. In contrast to the large theoretical and empirical 
literature on the trade effects of FTAs, very little has been done in the area of investment. Given 
the  empirically-verified  importance  of  trade-FDI  links  and  its  importance  to  economy-wide 
growth and development, such research could pay rich dividends, particularly for developing 
countries. In addition to expanding on such models as those surveyed above (and in Box 1) 
and applying them to specific Asian cases, scholars could focus on the issue of investment 
diversion, in terms of both potential investment diversion due to emerging bilateral and regional 
accords ��d ex p��� estimates as to whether major agreements outside the region (such as 
NAFTA and the expansion of the EU) have resulted in investment diversion.
•  M�re re�e�r�h �� �DI ��d �e�h����gy �p����ver� �� �he ����ex� �f �TA�. We noted in our 
“taxonomy of FTA best practices” that certain policies within FTAs, for example, with respect to 
IPR protection or “Singapore Issues”-related areas such as investment codes, could enhance 
not only FDI inflows but also technology transfer. Useful studies in this regard would include: 
(i) An integrated review of the related theoretical literature; and (ii) empirical research as to 
technology transfer and productivity spillovers in the context of FTAs. 
•  ��mprehe���ve  �ppr���he�  ��  ref�rm��g  �he  WTO  ��  e��ure  �h��  reg�����  ���egr����� 
��mp�eme���, r��her �h�� ����r�d����, mu������er�� g����. It was noted above that the Doha 
Development Agenda is slated with the task of reforming Article XXIV such that it has more 
“teeth.” However, not much progress was made in this regard, as the single-undertaking has 
not proceeded effectively. This is unfortunate; we have argued that the regionalism trend is 
here to stay, regardless of what eventually happens to Doha. Hence, ensuring compatibility 
is of the essence. But how could this be done in practical terms? An economist’s immediate 
response would be fairly easy to construct; require them to embrace open regionalism (suxh 
as include a clause that states no barriers to trade can rise on non-partners exports to the 
region, rather just saying that no average increase would suffice). But is this politically feasible? 
Unlikely. Hence, development of a practical framework with open regionalism at its heart would 
be highly useful.
•  A���y���  �f  whe�her  �r  “�ubreg�������m”  ���  be  �  u�efu�  ��mp�eme��  ��  reg�������m  ��d 
mu������er����m. The idea of “growth triangles,” also known as “subregionalism,” became a 
popular concept after the creation of the first Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia was created in 
the early 1990s. Since then a number of additional arrangements have emerged, such as the 
East Asian Growth Triangle (Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines), for which the 
ADB undertook a major study (ADB 1996) and more recently the Greater Mekong Subregion 
initiatives (see, for example, Menon 2005) and proposals that include various PRC regions; 
Hong Kong, China; and Macau SAR. To what degree have these initiatives been successful, 
and to what degree can they complement bilateral and plurilateral arrangements in the region? 53
Landingin and Wadley (2005), for example, suggest that while the East Asian Growth Triangle 
has had difficulties for various reasons, the economics would suggest that this type of approach 
can be effective. Menon (2005) also suggests that the Greater Mekong Subregion has been 
effective in helping member states integrate more effectively into ASEAN and is a good example 
of first-best regionalism. 
•  ��p����y Bu��d��g f�r Be�� Pr�����e� �� deve��p��g A���� ��u��r�e�. As is clear from the above 
discussion,  embracing  best  practices  in  regional  arrangements  is  complicated,  even  for 
developed countries. Moreover, in addition to creating and implementing new policies, it will 
require the development of new institutions and innovative approaches to macroeconomic and 
microeconomic policies. Projects will need to be developed that can, ���er ����, explain the need 
for associated measures and policies, convey and build capacity to evaluate their scope and 
implications for the economy to policy makers, businesspeople, academics, and civil society; 
help with related institution-building; and give instructions and training as to how they can be 
implemented. Strengthening capacity in these areas will be important not only for the bilateral 
and regional accords that these countries enter but also for the effective implementation of 
(hopefully successful) future accords under the WTO. Such projects will be required in the 
short-, medium-, and long-run. 
These are but a few of a wide variety of possible issues that beg examination as the regionalism trend 
continues apace. Given the growing importance of Asia in world trade, what happens here will be of 
interest not only in the region but also in the world as a whole. The nuts-and-bolts of regionalism and its 
associated institutions, so often ignored by economists, require much closer study. It would behoove us 
to move on from the divisive regionalism versus multilateralism debate, which has not been particularly 
productive; accept regionalism as a reality, and work seriously to ensure that regionalism ends up 
promoting multilateral goals. 54
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